Nest Of Spies

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Re: Nest Of Spies

Post: # 139275Unread post Blue Frost »

The Clinton's was, and Illegally whet there many years ago.
Likely Ted Kennedy was also.


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Re: Nest Of Spies

Post: # 141135Unread post Gary Oak »

With muslims taking up so much resources China must be enjoying this diversion from their activities.

Nuclear espionage charge for China firm with one-third stake in UK's Hinkley Point China General Nuclear Power, and engineer Allen Ho, allegedly conspired to develop nuclear material without US approval

The Chinese company with a major stake in the proposed Hinkley Point C nuclear power station has been charged by the US government over nuclear espionage, according to the US justice department.

In a 17-page indictment, the US government said nuclear engineer Allen Ho, employed by the China General Nuclear Power Company, and the company itself had unlawfully conspired to develop nuclear material in China without US approval and “with the intent to secure an advantage to the People’s Republic of China”.

Allen Ho, nuclear engineer employed by the China General Nuclear Power Company, charged by the US government over nuclear espionage. Photograph: Knox County Sheriff's Office CGNPC has a 33% stake in the £18bn Hinkley Point project in Somerset, which Theresa May has delayed partly because of concerns over China’s involvement. The delay prompted a warning earlier this week from the Chinese ambassador to the UK, who said that relations between the two countries are at a “crucial historical juncture”.

Assistant US attorney general John P Carlin said: “Allen Ho, at the direction of a Chinese state-owned nuclear power company allegedly approached and enlisted US-based nuclear experts to provide integral assistance in developing and producing special nuclear material in China.

“Ho did so without registering with the Department of Justice as an agent of a foreign nation or authorisation from the US Department of Energy”, Carlin continued. “Prosecuting those who seek to evade US law by attaining sensitive nuclear technology for foreign nations is a top priority for the National Security Division.”

Ho allegedly conspired with China from 1997 to April 2016, said the indictment that was unsealed in April. Conspiring to unlawfully engage and participate in the development of nuclear material outside of the US carries a maximum sentence of life in prison and a fine of $250,000 (£192,000). Conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government in the US carries a maximum prison sentence of 10 years.

“The federal government has regulations in place to oversee civil nuclear cooperation”, said Michael Steinbach, executive assistant director of the FBI’s national security branch. “If those authorities are circumvented, this can result in significant damage to our national security.

“The US will use all of its law enforcement tools to stop those who try to steal US nuclear technology and expertise.”

Ho was born in China and is a naturalised US citizen with dual residency. CGNCP, the largest nuclear power company in China, is owned by that country’s state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state council.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/201 ... kley-point
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Re: Nest Of Spies

Post: # 144691Unread post Gary Oak »

It is very unlikely that they don't have anybody watching this forum.

China’s Internet Army Getting More 'Refined'
FILE - Customers surf the Internet at an Internet cafe in Beijing, China.
October 30, 2016
There is a real Chinese army. It is called the People’s Liberation Army. It is the largest military force in the world.
But there is also an online Chinese army. It is nicknamed the “50 Cent Army.”
The name is connected to people who post comments online that are in support of China. Many people once thought that they were regular citizens who were getting paid 50 cents for each pro-China post they wrote.
But a new study says that they are actually government employees working overtime.
A Harvard University study found that the “50 centers” are not young Chinese writing posts to earn money. They are actually government employees who work overtime. They post online messages designed to seem like ordinary citizens wrote them.
The Harvard study, published in August, said the posts are usually bland and pro-China.
“Almost none of the Chinese government’s 50-cent party posts engage in debate or argument of any kind,” the study said.
The “50 Cent Army” is busiest during patriotic holidays in China, or when the government wants to cover up news events, such as the independence protests in Hong Kong.
David Bandurski is the editor of the University of Hong Kong’s China Media Project. He was one of the first media experts to write about the virtual army. He wrote about the 50 Cent Army in 2008.
Bandurski said many in China are nervous during holidays or anniversaries of anti-communist protests. That is when the virtual army tries most to “redirectpublic opinion.”
The 50 Cent Army began in the early 2000s. At that time, most online discussions took place on message boards and in chat rooms. The army has had to change its methods in the “era of Weibo,” Bandurski said. Weibo is a Chinese social media site that is similar to Twitter and Facebook.
“By this point, everyone is interacting online in real time,” he said.
The Chinese government is also working with the Communist Youth League. The league is a powerful group of 89 million people. Its members are between the ages of 14 and 28. The government works with the youth league to “purify” the Internet.
Experts say its members are more aggressive than the 50 Cent Army described in the Harvard study. They are also more skilled at posting on foreign social media sites that are blocked in China.
The group wrote 40,000 negative comments on the Facebook page of an Australian Olympic swimmer who called a Chinese swimmer “a drug cheat.”
They did the same thing when Tsai Ing-wen was elected president of Taiwan. Foreign Policy magazine reported that some 40,000 negative comments appeared on her Facebook page in just 12 hours.
Bandurski called the youth league members “volunteer armies of mobilized, angry youth.” He said they are happy to “spam” the president of Taiwan.
FILE - A computer user sits near displays with a message from the Chinese police on the proper use of the internet at an internet cafe in Beijing, China, Aug. 19, 2013.
FILE - A computer user sits near displays with a message from the Chinese police on the proper use of the internet at an internet cafe in Beijing, China, Aug. 19, 2013.
He described them as “version 2.0” of the 50 Cent Army.
Bandurski said that he does not think the Communist Youth League members get paid to post the negative comments. They also often use their real names, he said.
Experts say there is evidence that China is becoming more effective at controlling online opinions. Bandurski said efforts by the 50 Cent Army are getting ”more sophisticated and more refined.”
“The 50 Cent Army doesn’t just fade away,” Bandurski said.
I’m Dan Friedell.

http://chinawatchcanada.blogspot.ca/201 ... -more.html
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Re: Nest Of Spies

Post: # 148382Unread post Gary Oak »

Chinese don't even trust each other. What does that tell you. They are watching each other constantly searching for gossip or things to use against someone or an edge etc...

700 Million Androids Pre-Installed with Chinese Spyware

Chinese software company called Adups, whose firmware comes pre-installed on some 700 million Android devices, has been found to be able to collect personal information from users without their knowledge or consent.Security analyst firm Kryptowire first discovered the privacy breach in November 2016. Adups data mining was revealed almost by accident by a Kryptowire employee who discovered a backdoor allowing information to be leaked. After that, antivirus manufacturer Trustlook dug deeper and the scope of the privacy violations facilitated by Adups was quickly shown to be significant. The Adups data collector was found to collect text messages, call history, and device information from phones upon which it is installed. Adups denied that the software is used to collect private user data, but was instead put in place "to identify junk text messages and calls." They then referred to the installation of it on US phones as a "mistake." The majority of Android phones that use Adups are smaller companies that only release devices in Asia. However, BLU Products (which claims to have sold 35 million devices in the Western hemisphere) and several other well-known manufacturers including Lenovo and ZTE also install Adups firmware on their smartphones. BLU announced that they will no longer use Adups firmware on their phones, switching it out for one made by Google. Lenovo, ZTE, and others have followed suit. © Photo: PixabayOver $5.4 Million Stolen by Hackers From Russian Android Users Another endangered piece of hardware? Barnes and Noble’s NOOK Tablet 7, which, unlike a mobile phone, cannot remove its Adups firmware with a software update. Fred Argir, Barnes and Noble chief digital officer, issued a statement that Adups does not collect personal information from any of their users. He also said that the bookseller is working on a way to remove Adups from NOOK. Trustlook advises Android users to upgrade their firmware to the latest version as soon as possible if they believe their phone may have privacy-violating software such as Adups installed. Android devices typically rely on third party hardware and software, and thus are seen as more vulnerable to security breaches than their Apple counterparts. A piece of malware called "Gooligan" infected over a million Android devices in late November, putting control of the devices into the hands of hackers. Most of the compromised phones were in Asia. In August, mobile security experts found that the 900 million Android phones made with circuits from the component maker Qualcomm were highly vulnerable to cyberattacks....RedditGoogle+BloggerPinterestStumbleUponTelegramWhatsApp79

Read more: https://sputniknews.com/science/2016122 ... e-spyware/
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Re: Nest Of Spies

Post: # 155050Unread post Gary Oak »

A friend who speaks manderin, has an Asian studies degree and almost two masters degrees and taught in a Korean university for over a dozen years told me that about 70% of the mainland Chinese students are agents. I don't find t his hard to believe at all.

Chinese Spying---Guanxi ["fenqing" students?]


Dan Stober
Author, A Convenient Spy: Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear Espionage
read the full interviewThe Soviets used blackmail. The Soviets used people who had an ideological bent towards communism, and the Soviets and the United States would find weaknesses in people and exploit that. …
The Chinese, on the other hand, had a much different approach. They would send their scientists to America, and of course lots and lots of students come to the United States. Many of them stay here, and the approach is often described as a thousand grains of sand, which some people have objected to, but it's a pretty good description actually. Everybody gathers a little bit of information -- I don't mean every Chinese person in America, but everybody that's working for them -- and they assemble it.
When Chinese scientists come to the United States, they make contacts. It's alarming to FBI agents and members of Congress who have no idea that there are Chinese scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory, at Lawrence Livermore, and the first time they hear this, that "My God, in Los Alamos, you're telling me there's Chinese nuclear weapon scientists? This can't be true." And of course the reverse is true, that American scientists have been going to China since around 1980 and once they get there, the techniques of gathering information used by the Chinese, first of all, is just to talk to these people a lot. If you spend a couple of weeks with somebody and get tours of the Great Wall and banquets and trips to their ancestral homeland, if they're Chinese American, then people talk and there's useful information.
They also use techniques such as after a long day at the Wall and a long banquet with lots of alcohol, you find yourself in a hotel room, perhaps surrounded by Chinese who are asking you lots and lots of questions and implying that there's an obligation for you to answer because "We've been so nice to you," or perhaps if you're Chinese American, "To help the motherland." And by the way, "Your grandmother who lives on the third floor of her apartment in Beijing, we just put her on the first floor for you so she doesn't have to walk up the stairs anymore." And if that sort of technique gleans one piece of information, fine. Tomorrow there'll be another piece of information. …
You mean they're not any more sophisticated than this? I thought there would be dead drops at phone booths outside restaurants.
Well, a good question. The Chinese don't do dead drops, the Chinese don't do phone booths. The Chinese would much rather have you come to China and "let's sit around and talk." Or "talk to us in the United States and don't go steal documents for us. We don't want you to steal documents, it just gets you caught. And you're doing this for the betterment of the world,"or if they're playing it here, "you're Chinese American, Taiwanese or mainland American, help the motherland. You're all overseas Chinese. We're a poor country, America's a rich country. It's not going to hurt America to help us." It's that sort of pitch. And yes they use the United States mail. It's not been published before, but it's true.



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James Lilley
U.S. Ambassador to China, 1989-1991; CIA in China 1975-1978
read the full interviewHow do they do it? How is [China's] espionage different than, let's say, the Russians or the East Germans were?
It's different. It has the same objectives because they all go back to Sun Tzu, in one form or another, [in] the 5th century B.C., who had the five kinds of spies. He wrote the booking on spying. The Chinese have done espionage, and spying, and intelligence work very well since the beginning. It's all through the romance of the three kingdoms. It's been a central part of their work.
They use different techniques. You don't find the case officer in a trench coat on the corner making a pass with an agent or laying down a dead drop, necessarily. What you find is the massive collection technique, the vacuum cleaner. Somebody once said -- I think this is in Nick [Eftimiades]'s book -- "If the Russians want to get certain sand from a beach that's special, they'll have a submarine come in at night. They'll put a crew infiltration. They'll get a bucket full of sand, and they'll take it back to the submarine and leave." The Chinese will have 500 people having picnics on the beach, each picking up the sand in a small can, and bringing it back.
It's a different technique. They rely much more on contacts, persuasion. Only a small percentage is for actually clandestine work. They do that, but a very small percentage. And it's very frustrating for people like the FBI who are looking for the classical intelligence man. They found one in Larry Wu-Tai Chin in 1985. We got that through a penetration in the Ministry of State Security, Yu Qiangsheng. And, that broke the case. But that case showed us their techniques. And their techniques were quite different. This man was never handled in the country, never saw the embassy. He always went to third countries, Canada or Hong Kong, and did his work there. ...
But through the years, we've picked up on their training techniques. We've got a number of defectors from embassy intelligence people who have told us the way they train, the way they recruit, the way they motivate, the way they dispatch under cover, either unofficial or official cover, for a third country, targeting certain areas, with a very heavy emphasis in the United States on technology.


FBI Special Agent, 1973-1997; specialized in counterintelligence.
read the full interviewThe word about the Chinese is that they do things differently. They've been doing this for 4,000 years, that they operate on the basis of relationships, interpersonal relationships. They call it "guanxi." They call it developing a superior subordinate relationship with someone, to trade information back and forth with someone.
At the end of the day, though, intelligence collection methodology relies on someone who knows telling someone who is trying to collect information. So, whether the person is paid or not, whether the person owes a debt of gratitude or owes some kind of guanxi to the other person, at the end of the day, the intelligence service succeeds by establishing sources. And that's the way the Chinese work, just like everybody else. …
They do run agents. They do collect intelligence through classic operations. But by and large, they rely on a large number of what they call "overseas Chinese" and a few non-Chinese to provide them with information, basically, because of the relationships they build over time.
Basically, it's a game played on the use of assets.
Right. And an asset is somebody you know that can give you what you want. And obviously, you develop a relationship where that person wants to give you things, where that person actively goes out and collects things for you.
In our thinking here in the West, we tend to think about an employer/employee relationship or a contractor relationship so that, in a secret way, the contractor goes out and collects information, and then brings it, for money, to the intelligence officer who is running the operation. But oftentimes the Chinese don't feel it's necessary to pay that person, or at least not to pay the person for intelligence. They might get paid because they have a strong business relationship with the Chinese government. But they might not get paid specifically for the intelligence that they bring. And the idea is that the person is so obliged to the person who has the guanxi with them, that, out of a sense of duty, a sense of obligation, a sense of togetherness, on behalf of the motherland, this person will take risks and bring information as a part of the overall relationship. …
So we found that frequently the Chinese intelligence services were practically invisible to their sources, because the relationship between the intelligence officer and the source was a personal relationship, and was one of mutual obligation. The source didn't think of himself as an employee or contractor. The source thought of himself a person who should go out and do for a friend, for a colleague. …
The way you define it, a lot of times it does turn into a game of spy versus spy, in a way. A lot of times it isn't the hot dog dealer, it is people that have relationships with friends in China with MSS or other organizations. Is it really a large proportion of this game being played between the two intelligence services?
Sure. It's the way the game is played. Obviously, it is spy versus spy. That's what counterintelligence is. And at the end of the day, the better your operation as a counterintelligence service, the more you know about that foreign intelligence service. And hopefully they don't know that you know it. Hopefully, you can to some extent contain their operations, and understand more about their operations than they want you to, so that you know what they're looking for and you know who they're using. You know their order of battle. You know what their targets are. You know what information they need.
I can remember a time many years ago when Chinese intelligence service sent a high-ranking intelligence officer to discover what this "Supreme Court thing" is that the U.S. has. Well, that's the kind of intelligence operation we want to see. Frankly, we'll help that guy find out all about the Supreme Court. But when the intelligence officer comes after weapons systems, that's a whole different thing, and we want to know what weapons systems they're coming after. And we want to know where they're seeking market intelligence about particular companies or about particular opportunities they might have to compete in the economic sphere. …
I think you need to look at the demographics. We've gotten very focused in recent years on this racial profiling thing. But let's look at it from the point of view of the Chinese intelligence officer. One of the things you find out if you're a Chinese intelligence officer is that the Asia-Pacific population in America has gone from less than 1 percent to more than 3 percent of the population, and considerably more than that in West Coast cities like San Francisco and Los Angeles, where there's a huge amount of U.S. government classified contracting.
Then you find out that in the physical sciences and engineering at the head of the most complex and most valuable research and development that the U.S. is doing, you will find a very high percentage of Chinese. Five to 10 percent in some cases. Why is this? Well, it's their chosen profession. Coincidence? Who knows? Who cares?
Now the point of the matter is, if I'm a Chinese intelligence officer and I'm looking at this group of people who know about, let's just say nuclear engineering, who am I going to look at? Am I going to look at the Italian American? Am I going to look at the Irish-American? Or am I going to look at the Chinese-American, who still speaks my language, who still has an aunt over in Shanghai. So if I'm a Chinese intelligence officer, I'm not thinking about infiltrating somebody into that nuclear engineering facility. I'm thinking about how do I go about getting access to that Chinese person who's already there? How do I recruit that person? How do I develop guanxi with that person? How do I assume a relationship in which I have the upper hand and I can convince that person to share information with me?
At the end of the day, it's pretty elementary from the standpoint of the Chinese intelligence service. They do practice racial profiling, and it's very successful for them.
And your answer to the claims out there that what that does is it leads to a stereotype, a double standard, where it's not only a few people, but anyone who's of Chinese ancestry is viewed with a different lens? How does one get around that, that there might be a double standard?
It really isn't a double standard when you stop and think about it. It's basic methodology. It's basic counterintelligence methodology and security methodology. The first question you ask yourself is, does that foreign intelligence service have power over that person? If they have control over the relatives of that person, the place where those relatives live, the welfare of those relatives -- that's a tremendous leverage or potential leverage over that person. Obviously a source of potential influence.
And the other aspect of it is, how can I best find out what I need to find out? Maybe English is my second language. If I have somebody I can talk to in my own native tongue, that's a huge advantage to me. From the standpoint of the security guy, if you were looking at three candidates for a position at HP, and one of the candidates was coming from Dell Computer, would you automatically put him at the head of the line, or would you put him last in line, because that's a competitor of yours. You don't want to hire a competitor. So it's the same kind of thing in the intelligence game. You want to hire somebody to do nuclear engineering, do you really want to hire somebody with a whole bunch of relatives in a hostile foreign nation? Or not? It's a call that you have to make. …

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t. van magers
FBI Special Agent, 1969-2002
read the full interviewWho is a Chinese spy? Who are you looking for when you're in Chinese counterintelligence? Are they different than, for example, Russian spies?
Absolutely. And that's one of the difficulties in dealing with Chinese counterintelligence. Against most countries, you identify intelligence officers, you determine the agency for whom they work, you know what sort of information they will seek based on their employment, and you go from there, developing a technique to counter them.
With Chinese you have known intelligence officers who don't engage in intelligence activities. You have known intelligence officers who do. You have persons who have no connection with Chinese intelligence -- I mean, not even a peripheral one -- who engage in intelligence collection.
You have intelligence officers in the country who are here to make money. The Chinese are bureaucratic, as I guess most governments can be, and there is a level of approval for expenditures that's really relatively low. You have to go quite high to approve spending in even the most unimportant area. However, if you have someone overseas who's making money, then the level of approval of that operation overseas making money, can approve spending the money that you make. So you immediately increase your budget substantially if you have money-making operations abroad. So we see intelligence personnel abroad, and all we see them doing is making money, and at first we couldn't understand that, and later we realized they were making money and that was the goal, so that other personnel would have money to spend on operations.
Our standard statement is Chinese is different, and it is. And because it is different, it's made it a challenge for us to be successful. Ultimately we weren't successful in identifying a lot of their activities and a lot of their targets, but still, because of the difference, it's often difficult to explain and justify budgets for continuing operations against the Chinese.
And in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, did what they were looking for in the United States of America change?
Sure. Initially when the first group got to the United Nations -- and this is one person's perspective -- seeing that they were interested in leading the non-aligned nations group in cultivating ethnic Chinese to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people vis-à-vis Taiwan, and to get general information. I mean, I remember when the Chinese first came to the mission to the U.N., even before the liaison office in Washington, they obtained the entire printed output, every document that NASA put out each year -- how much it was to upgrade their system, or to know what our system was, I don't know.
But we knew what they got in just public source material. And an awful lot of what they did then was public source material, where they would meet with U.S. politicians or U.S. reporters, wine them, dine them, and talk to them about what was happening. And this was major information. They considered it the most sensitive information again, and classified it very highly and sent back. And it's the stuff that you read in the Op Ed page of The Washington Post or The New York Times each day. You could read political columnists. If it were today's environment, you would watch Fox News, or CNN, or PBS, and you would listen to the talking heads, and that's what the Chinese got, and that was important to them.
For us, we wouldn't have turned around for it, but they reported it, and were given high marks by their senior officials in Beijing for getting that information.
And then the arc of information gathering, take me to the 1990s. What are they after by the 1990s?
When I left the field in the early '90s, there were so many different groups of people in the United States from China. There were still political people who were interested in that. There were persons in the embassy and the consulates who were responsible for keeping track of ethnic Chinese in the United States. There were those responsible for students, and they wanted to make sure that they toed the party line, particularly in the aftermath of Tiananmen. There were commercial officials in the U.S. running companies, some legitimate, some engaging in business activities but with other purposes, such as to make money for intelligence. Some it seems as loss leaders just for raising the Chinese profile. …
One of the things about countering Chinese intelligence activities that is such a challenge is that again, the persons who collect intelligence, including classified information, often are not traditionally-trained spies. If you have someone from an institute in Shenyang that makes cruise missiles, and that person comes to the United States and develops information that his factory might use, an institute might sponsor a student to come to the United States, and the purpose is to get more information to come back and to enhance that facility's capacity. …
In dealing with the Chinese, we've had any number of persons the Chinese have dealt with who we've later talked to, many of whom have been in positions with great access. And the Chinese tend not to give specific instructions in most cases, about what information should be gleaned. … The Chinese response would probably be, "You give us what you think we need."
Well, try proving that in court as a case of Chinese espionage. They tend to be non-specific, and I guess if you accept their position as being willing to send a lot of sources out to get small bits of information, and then to reassemble it back in China, it works well. If you have a relatively large number of sources, and you're interested in running them for a long time, and you're not willing to compromise them for short-term gain, then you do it the way the Chinese do it.
If, on the other hand, you want immediate gratification, you want the hard facts, you want them now, you want specific information, you want it sooner rather than later, then you develop the sort of facts that the FBI can prosecute, or the FBI can develop information about so the Department of Justice can prosecute them -- and the Chinese don't work that way. And as a result, countering them is so much more difficult because you don't have those difficult, those hard-edged intelligence officers who look guilty on the stand.
I mean, I remember one case in which a person engaging in intelligence activities had his kids in the room with him when he was meeting with someone. And you've never, you can't imagine how unattractive it would be to present in court espionage in the background and two kids watching TV in the foreground. I mean it just, you're not going to make a case that's going to be binding. This is the bad guy you want to send away for life? You know, it's a hard target because of the way they do what they do, and the fact that it's so different from the others, and the fact that there isn't, for the most part, the central direction and control that leads to the specificity you need to get the elements of the client.


Director of Intelligence, U.S. Energy Department, 1994-1999
[China] relied on a much wider range of potential agents: students, businessmen, visiting scientists, academic exchanges, and so forth, many of whom come to this country with specific taskings from both their institutes and also the Chinese intelligence services, the Ministry of State Security, and so forth. So that the threat, in the information that we were presented from the FBI, what I came away with was the threat was much broader and consequently probably much more difficult to deal with. And my experience later showed that to be true. …
The motivation of the Chinese?
Well, I can't speak to the entire program. What I can speak to is what I was told. And what I was told was that in a number of the cases that we encountered, visiting laboratory scientists would be told by the Chinese that, one, that the United States was a very strong country, that China was a very weak country, and that, you know, these individual scientists had a responsibility to help their motherland, the People's Republic. And it was clear to us in the nuclear program that what the Chinese were worried about was that they were falling further and further behind the United States. …
So the Chinese were looking at all this and they're looking at their own strategic force posture, and they're realizing just how incredibly vulnerable that posture is. If you're working a scenario that involves, you know, Taiwan, and across the Taiwan Straits, and you want to keep the United States, you need a credible deterrent. Rebuilding, re-establishing the credibility of that deterrent, to us, it was what was driving Chinese espionage, at least as it was targeted against our laboratories and nuclear complexes.
So Chinese espionage, who's attracted to them, who did they look for to sort of become their asset?
There are differing views on that, and I heard differing views. From [former FBI China analyst] Paul Moore, particularly, but others, we heard that the Chinese focused just on ethnic Chinese: that that was their target, that's who they went after. Paul Moore specifically told us that the Chinese methodology worked very well against institutions that had relatively large numbers of ethnic Chinese. And he would site specifically the laboratories and Silicon Valley. It did not work very well against institutions like the U.S. army, which did not have high numbers.
Now my experience and my approach to this was different. Based on what I saw on the counterintelligence interviews that were done, on the case histories that were done, my impression was that that was far too narrow an approach; that the Chinese had seemed to us would come to anyone who would talk to them. They like to focus on fairly senior managers at the laboratories who would be allowed to travel by themselves, unescorted, and might be willing to talk. And that included, you know, some very senior people at Los Alamos, Livermore, and so forth -- regardless of ethnicity. On the other hand, it's also clear that ethnic Chinese scientists, naturalized Chinese citizens, were also part of the target set, but not the only part…

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Re: Nest Of Spies

Post: # 155253Unread post Gary Oak »

Hopefully CSIS is very aware of this. I believe that Chinese spying is actually even larger than this and I mean a lot larger. This won't matter to Justin Traitor Trudeau, he won't think twice about selling Canada out to the Chinese. Why should he ? He has his cash ? I can't believe so many Canadians voted fro him. Don't they know anything about Pierre Trudeau ?

Chinese spies in Australia on the rise, former diplomat Chen Yonglin says

Chen Yonglin, the Chinese diplomat who sensationally quit his job more than a decade ago, has broken a lengthy silence to warn of a growing number of spies and agents working for Beijing in Australia.

Chen Yonglin successfully sought political asylum in Australia after resigning his diplomat role
Warned more that 1,000 Chinese spies in Australia
Says "majority of Chinese community representatives" work for Government
In 2005, Mr Chen caused global headlines when he claimed China was operating a network of "over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants in Australia".
The former diplomat, who now works as a businessman, has warned the number of secretive Chinese operatives has steadily grown since he stopped working for China's foreign service.
"There should be some increase after over 10 years because China is now the wealthiest government in the world, they should have money, they should be [able] to afford raise a huge number of spies here," he told ABC News.
He stressed the increase was mainly in casual informants who provided crucial pieces of intelligence to Beijing.
Since successfully seeking political asylum in Australia, Mr Chen said he had become growingly concerned about Beijing's influence in his new home.
He believes that of particular concern is last year's decision to approve a 99-year lease of the Port of Darwin to Chinese-owned company Landbridge.
"I think it's very stupid. It's common sense that Darwin Port is strategically important and against the northern invasion," he said.
Mr Chen has also hit out at activists who have recently taken to the streets to show support for China's military expansion in the South China Sea.
"A majority of Chinese community representatives work for the Chinese Government," he said.

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Gary Oak
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Nest Of Spies

Post: # 157589Unread post Gary Oak »

This comes as no surprise to me. CSIS has found that chinese canadiscams will spy for free and seldom have to even pay them and professor henry yu wants to flood chinese in in spite of how horrible he says white people are to chinese here.



Chinese Billionaire Warns America: China Has 25,000 Spies Who Are “Ready To Destroy The U.S.”

Since the 1980’s, the US has caught and imprisoned over a dozen people who were spying on American government agencies and corporations. So we catch Chinese spies once every few years. With that kind of frequency, you’d probably assume that China doesn’t have that many intelligence assets in America at any given time. Based on those numbers, a safe estimate would be in the hundreds, or perhaps thousands.

But it turns out that those estimates would be incredible low. According to Guo Wengui, a billionaire investor who has fled China and moved to New York since becoming a major critic of the Chinese regime, there are probably 25,000 spies in America who are working for Beijing.

Those numbers are derived from what he claims, are his close ties to multiple Chinese intelligence agencies. That may sound far fetched to most Americans, but in China the public and private sectors are closely aligned. They’re practically the same entity. So we should take his warnings very seriously, which were brought up in a recent interview with The Freebeacon.

Guo said that Chinese intelligence operations in the United States sharply increased after the 2012 Communist Party Congress that brought current leader Xi Jinping to power.

“Before 2012, cumulatively China had around 10,000 to 20,000 agents working in the United States,” he said. “These agents had been sent to work in the United States over a 50 year period of time, and they were working in a defensive mode.”

According to the businessman, defensive intelligence was mainly focused on learning about the United States. The operations then shifted in 2012 to “offensive” spying, he said.

“By offensive [operations], I mean to be ready to destroy the U.S. in ways they can,” Guo said.

And these spies don’t just consist of Chinese immigrants. According to Guo, many of them are treasonous Americans who have sold their country out for a paycheck, and they can be ruthless.

China’s budget for intelligence gathering before 2012 was around $600 million annually.

Around 2012, a decision was made by Chinese leaders to dispatch another 5,000 spies to the United States. “Some of them were sent as students, some as businessmen, and some as immigrants, but all together, 5,000,” Guo said.

“In addition to that, they developed between 15,000 to 18,000 other spies, and these are not directly sent but these are developed within the United States.”

The recruited agents are not limited to Asians and Chinese-Americans but include all ethnic groups, including Hispanics, Blacks, and Caucasians.

“And now the budget is between $3 billion to $4 billion annually, and this is information up to one month ago,” he said.

Guo said American counterintelligence agencies face several problems, mainly a lack of knowledge about Chinese intelligence agencies.

“You don’t know which organizations in China are responsible for sending these spies, how they are managed, and to what purpose,” he said. “And the U.S. adopts a very legalistic perspective to look at the question of spying. Yet, for China their methods are not what the United States understands.”

“These spies, when they come to the United States, they could sleep around, they could put poison in your glass of wine to kill you; completely unscrupulous,” he said.

As for their goals, Guo claims that the spies are mainly here to steal military technologies. But they’re also here to “buy” high level government officials, as well as political and corporate elites who can give China favorable business deals. And most what’s most frightening, is that these spies have implanted malicious software in our most critical infrastructure systems, and have thoroughly infiltrated our government’s major weapons suppliers.

Which raises an important question. How did our government let this happen? Isn’t the all powerful NSA surveillance grid capable of catching these people?

Apparently not. It appears that we’ve traded our freedom for security, but somewhere along the line we didn’t receive any security. While our government was busy funding and training the terrorists that would later inspire the acceptance of widespread government surveillance and the destruction of our civil liberties, they overlooked the flood of Chinese spies who have infiltrated every level of our society.

You could call it incompetence, but it could also be something far more sinister. As Joel Skousen has pointed out many times, our government is riddled with globalists who have a hidden agenda. They want to usher in another world war between the US, China, and Russia, which will bring about the destruction of America, and make way for a global government. As part of that plan, they have been undermining America at every turn in the hopes that our country will lose the war against China; a war which they are orchestrating. Perhaps as a part of that effort, they’ve been looking the other way as the Chinese government steals and compromises our infrastructure and advanced military technologies.

Whatever the case may be, if Guo is correct then America is a severely compromised nation that is in no position to fight another world war.



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Gary Oak
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Nest Of Spies

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Chinese Intelligence Worldwide remains at Unprecedented levels Espionage Government Spies

Chinese intelligence operations worldwide to steal important information both through human agents and cyber attacks are a growing threat, according to experts who testified at a US congressional commission last week.Beijing’s spies, operating through the civilian Ministry of State Security and People’s Liberation Army Intelligence Bureau (IB), have scored impressive gains against the United States in particular, where economic espionage — the theft of trade secrets and high technology — remains at unprecedented levels.Technology espionage by China was highlighted by the conviction in California last week of Wenxia Man of San Diego who was convicted of illegally conspiring to export fighter jet engines and an unmanned aerial vehicle to China.

According to trial evidence in the case, Man conspired with Chinese national Xinsheng Zhang in China, to illegally acquire and export Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines used in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter; Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines used in the F-22 Raptor fighter jet; and General Electric F110-GE-132 engines designed for the F-16 fighter jet.
Additionally, the case involved plans to export the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B unmanned aerial vehicle that can be armed with Hellfire missiles.
Man told an undercover agent in the case that Zhan was a technology spy working for the Chinese military to replicate foreign defense items obtained abroad. The conspiracy highlighted the key targets of Chinese espionage.
160 Chinese agents identified
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The CI Centre, a counterintelligence think tank, has identified a total 160 Chinese espionage agents uncovered in the United States between 1985 and 2016, one less than spy cases run by Moscow against the United States. Many involved theft of industrial or trade secrets useful to the Chinese military.
In Taiwan, a total of 56 Chinese agents were identified between 2002 and 2016, according to the center. Taiwan authorities in recent years have uncovered several high-level spies operating against the Taiwanese government.
“The PRC today is the most aggressive intelligence threat facing the United States,” said former FBI Agent David Major, currently director of the CI Centre.
Major testified at a hearing of the congressional commission the reason China poses a significant espionage threat is the Beijing’s government’s combined use of technical cyber attacks and sophisticated human spying to steal secrets and other information.
“FBI investigations and arrests for industrial espionage and violations of export control laws are at an all-time high, predominately linked to the Chinese government,” said Michele Van Cleave, former National Counterintelligence Executive, a senior US government counterspy post.
FBI economic espionage cases increased 53% from 2014 to 2015, and the number of cases currently underway is in the hundreds.
Peter Mattis, a China affairs analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, warned that China’s spy services target young people who travel to China.

The US announced criminal charges in 2014 against five Chinese army hackers for stealing trade secrets from American companies
Recruiting students
“China’s intelligence services have demonstrated repeatedly over the last three decades the willingness to recruit students and others inside China who might be directed to join the US Government in the hopes of future access,” Mattis said.
Major, Van Cleave and Mattis were among several intelligence experts who revealed new details about Chinese intelligence activities during a hearing last week of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a US Congress entity.
Van Cleave noted that some of the most damaging Chinese espionage occurred more than 20 years ago when a Chinese defector revealed that US nuclear weapons secrets had been compromised through spying.
Yet the crime, originally linked to Los Alamos nuclear laboratory technician Wen Ho Lee, remains unsolved.
“The [People’s Republic of China] stole design information on all of the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons,” Van Cleave said. “This includes every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the US ballistic missile arsenal, as well as design information on enhanced radiation weapons. We still do not know how they did it. The troubling question is, why not?”

China currently is engaged in a major strategic nuclear forces buildup that analysts say has benefited from the theft of US nuclear secrets.
Shortcomings among counterintelligence agencies within the open democratic societies have made it relatively easy for China to conduct large-scale successful intelligence operations. The activities include both the recruitment of agents with access to secrets, as well as the use of cyber penetrations of government and private sector networks to obtain mass amounts of valuable data.
Blackmail US government workers
The hacking attack against the US Office of Personnel Management was an extremely damaging compromise that will greatly benefit Chinese intelligence activities.
The loss of sensitive records on 22 million US government workers included every employee with access to secrets, providing China’s Ministry of State Security and IB, formerly the PLA General Staff Second Department, with a gold mine of information useful in spotting and recruiting agents.
“The Chinese now have a detailed roster of most if not all American contractors and government employees who have access to classified information, plus a roster of their friends, colleagues or co-workers who may be useful conduits or potential assets in their own right,” Van Cleave said. “They also have a treasure trove of data that can be used to coerce, blackmail or recruit US sources or simply enable personalized phishing schemes.”
Additionally, by analyzing the stolen data on the foreign residence and travel of most American officials and can use the information to identify and disrupt US and foreign intelligence networks and operations.
Aggressive counterintelligence need
The solution to the problem is to increase awareness of the problem of Chinese intelligence operations, and to conduct aggressive counterintelligence activities against them. Those counterspying activities should include offensive strategic operations to recruit Chinese intelligence officers and use them to identify aggressive Beijing spying operations and disrupt them.
Like the Soviet KGB political police and intelligence services, China’s spy agencies’ foremost mission is maintaining rule of the Communist Party of China. An aggressive counterintelligence program against both the Ministry of State Security and PLA Intelligence Bureau would be an important first step in helping Beijing devolve its authoritarian system into a more democratic one.

China is alleged to have begun a widespread effort to acquire U.S. military technology and classified information and the trade secrets of U.S. companies.
The Chinese government is accused of stealing trade secrets and technology, often from companies in the United States, to help support its long-term military and commercial development. China has been accused of using a number of methods to obtain U.S. technology (using U.S. law to avoid prosecution), including espionage, exploitation of commercial entities and a network of scientific, academic and business contacts.
Although it uses a network of contacts to collect information used to benefit Chinese businesses, each bit of information does not invite scrutiny or prosecution by the U.S. government. Espionage cases include Larry Wu-Tai Chin, Katrina Leung, Gwo-Bao Min, Chi Mak and Peter Lee.
In addition to traditional espionage, China partners civilian Chinese companies with American businesses to acquire technology and economic data and uses cyber spying to penetrate the computer networks of U.S. businesses and government agencies; an example is the December 2009 Operation Aurora.
U.S. law enforcement officials have identified China as the most active foreign power involved in the illegal acquisition of American technology.
On May 19, 2014, the United States Department of Justiceannounced that a Federal grand jury had indicted five People’s Liberation Army officers for stealing confidential business information and intellectual property from U.S. commercial firms and planting malware on their computers.

High-profile Chinese spy cases in the U.S.,especially these later found falsefully accused, raise concerns by civil-rights groups about potential racial profiling of Chinese Americans, Asian Americans and immigrants of Chinese origin, particularly after the collapse of the “Chinese espionage” case against Wen Ho Lee.
A prominent Chinese American and a member of the Committee of 100, Dr. George Koo wrote an article in 2015 warning that “Chinese Americans continue to be victimized by racial profiling” after seeing the latest victim Sherry Chen, who was falsefully accused of spying for China.
METHODS

China is alleged to use a number of methods to operate in the United States.
Individuals attempt to obtain targeted information from open sources such as libraries, research institutions and unclassified databases.
Chinese travelers are recruited to carry out specific intelligence activities, and the Chinese government debriefs returnees from exchange programs, trade missions and scientific-cooperation programs.
Chinese citizens may be coerced to cooperate.
Partnerships between Chinese and foreign companies have been accused of existing solely to give Chinese defense industries access to advanced technology.
The regulatory and commercial environment in China pressures American and other foreign companies to transfer technology to their Chinese partner companies as part of doing business in the country.
Foreign companies provide technology, capital and manufacturing expertise to obtain access to Chinese markets, and high-tech equipment is purchased by Chinese agents operating front organizations in Hong Kong.
Some items (computers, semiconductors, software, telecommunications devices, and integrated circuits) may be used for military or civilian purposes.
China also uses state-run firms to purchase American companies with access to the targeted technology.
China also accesses foreign technology through industrial espionage, with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials rating China’s industrial-espionage and theft operations as the leading threat to U.S. technological security.
Between October 2002 and January 2003 five Chinese businessmen were accused of illegally shipping equipment and trade secrets from California to China, and U.S. officials prevented a Chinese man from shipping a new, high-speed computer used on classified projects (including nuclear-weapons development) from Sandia National Laboratories.
NUCLEAR ESPIONAGE

A 1999 United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military and Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China report, known as the Cox Report, warned that China has stolen classified information on every thermonuclear warhead in the country’s intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal.
Information is collected through espionage, reviews of U.S. technical and academic publications and interaction with U.S. scientists.
China tasks a large number of individuals to collect small pieces of information (which are collated and analyzed), and individual agents can more easily escape suspicion. U.S. government personnel suspect that China’s intelligence-gathering efforts directed towards the development of modern nuclear weapons are focused on the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia and Oak Ridge National Laboratories.
China is known to have stolen classified information on the W-56 Minuteman II ICBM, the W-62 Minuteman III ICBM, the W-70 Lance short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), the W-76 Trident C-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A ICBM, the W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM and the W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM and weapon-design concepts and features.
CYBERWARFARE

China conducts political and corporate espionage to access the networks of financial, defense and technology companies and research institutions in the United States.
Email attachments attempting to enter the networks of U.S. companies and organizations exploit security weaknesses in software.
A recipient opens an email attachment, apparently from a familiar source, containing a program which embeds in the recipient’s computer. The remotely controlled program allows an attacker to access the recipient’s email, send sensitive documents to specific addresses and turn on a web camera or microphone.
In January 2010, Google reported “a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google”.
According to investigators, the Google cyber-attack targeted theGmail accounts of Chinese human-rights activists.
At least 34 other companies have been attacked, including Yahoo, Symantec, Adobe, Northrop Grumman and Dow Chemical.
In January 2013, The New York Times reported that it was the victim of hacking attempts originating from China during the previous four months after it published an article on Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. According to the newspaper, the “attacks appear to be part of a broader computer espionage campaign against American news media companies that have reported on Chinese leaders and corporations.”
Chinese cyber-attacks seem to target strategic industries in which China lags; attacks on defense companies target weapons-systems information, and attacks on technology companies seek source code critical to software applications.
Operation Aurora emphasized what senior U.S. government officials have called an increasingly serious cyber threat to critical industries.
Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has suggested that cyberspace could be a fruitful realm for the United States and China to implement a policy of mutually assured restraint allowing both states to take measures they deem necessary for self-defense while agreeing to refrain from offensive steps. Such a policy would require oversight.
ESPIONAGE CASES


LARRY WU-TAI CHIN

Larry Wu-Tai Chin worked in the U.S. intelligence community for nearly 35 years while providing China with classified information.
Chin was recruited as a spy by a Chinese Communist official in 1948; an interpreter at the U.S. consulate in Shanghai, he was later hired by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service. After he became an American citizen in 1965 he was transferred to Arlington, Virginia, where he had access to reports from intelligence agents abroad and translations of documents acquired by CIA officers in China.
Chin sold classified National Intelligence Estimates pertaining to China and Southeast Asia to China, enabling the country to discover weaknesses in its intelligence agencies and compromise U.S. intelligence activities in the region. He provided sensitive information about Richard Nixon’s plans for normalizing relations with China two years before the president visited the country. In February 1986, Chin was convicted of 17 counts of espionage, conspiracy and tax evasion.
KATRINA LEUNG

In 1982 FBI special agent James Smith recruited Katrina Leung, a 28-year-old Chinese immigrant, to work in Chinese counterintelligence. Leung, a prominent business consultant, was valued for her contacts with high-level Chinese officials.
Smith and Leung became involved in a sexual relationship lasting nearly two decades.
At this time, Smith made classified documents available to Leung; she copied them, providing China with information on nuclear, military and political issues.
Another FBI agent, William Cleveland, also became sexually involved with Leung.
PETER LEE

Lee, a physicist born in China who worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and later for TRW Inc., pleaded guilty to lying on security-clearance forms and passing classified national-defense information to Chinese scientists on business trips to Beijing.
He compromised classified weapons information, microwave submarine-detection technology and other national-defense data, and the Department of Energy later concluded that his disclosure of classified information “was of significant material assistance to the PRC in their nuclear weapons development program … This analysis indicated that Dr. Lee’s activities have directly enhanced the PRC nuclear weapons program to the detriment of U.S. national security.”
CHI MAK

Chi Mak is a Chinese-born engineer who worked for L-3 Communications, a California-based defense contractor, as a support engineer on Navy quiet-drive propulsion technology.
According to recovered documents, he was instructed by his Chinese contacts to join “more professional associations and participate in more seminars with ‘special subject matters’ and to compile special conference materials on disk”.
He was instructed to gather information on space-based electromagnetic intercept systems, space-launched magnetic-levitation platforms, electromagnetic gun or artillery systems, submarine torpedoes, electromagnetic launch systems, aircraft carrier electronic systems, water-jet propulsion, ship submarine propulsion, power-system configuration technology, weapons-system modularization, technologies to defend against nuclear attack, shipboard electromagnetic motor systems, shipboard internal and external communications systems and information on the next generation of U.S. destroyers.
He photocopied thousands of documents before passing them onto his brother who would than fly to the PRC, acting as a courier. His brother was arrested at the airport with a briefcase full of documents and floppy-disk drives. In 2008, he was sentenced to a 24 1⁄2-year prison term for espionage.
MOO KO-SUEN

In May 2006, Ko-Suen (Bill) Moo pleaded guilty to being a covert agent of China. Moo attempted to purchase United States military equipment to send to China when he was arrested by undercover United States agents. Some of the equipment included an F-16 fighter jet engine, an AGM-129A cruise missile, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter engines and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles.
WEN HO LEE

Wen Ho Lee is a Taiwanese-American scientist who worked for the University of California at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He created simulations of nuclear explosions for the purpose of scientific inquiry and to improve the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In December 1999, a federal grand jury indicted him of stealing secrets about the arsenal for China.
After federal investigators could not prove the initial accusations, the government conducted a separate investigation. It could only charge Lee with improper handling of restricted data, part of the original 59-count indictment to which he pleaded guilty as part of aplea bargain. In June 2006, Lee received $1.6 million from the federal government and five media organizations as partial settlement of a civil suit he filed against them for leaking his name to the press before charges were filed against him. According to Lee, federal judge James A. Parker apologized for denying him bail and putting him in solitary confinement.
FEI YE AND MING ZHONG

Fei Ye, a U.S. citizen and Ming Zhong, a permanent resident of the United States were arrested at the San Francisco International Airport on November 23, 2001. They were accused of stealing trade secrets in designing a computer microprocessor to benefit China, although prosecutors did not allege that the Chinese government knew of their activities. In December 2002, they were charged with a total ten counts, including conspiracy, economic espionage, possession of stolen trade secretes and foreign transportation of stolen property. In 2006 (5 years after the arrest), they plead guilty to two counts each of economic espionage. In 2008, they were sentenced to a year in prison. They could have gotten 30 years maximum sentence. But prosecutors asked for less because of their cooperation. The charges represent the first conviction of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
HANJUAN JIN

Hanjuan Jin, a naturalized U.S. Citizen, was arrested in 2007. She was carrying documents from Motorola that she was taking to China.
Tried, and convicted, Jin was sentenced to four years for stealing trade secrets, but acquitted of economic espionage.
She had earned a master’s degree from University of Notre Dame, and earned a second master’s at Illinois Institute of Technology.
BO JIANG

Bo Jiang, a researcher working on “source code for high technology imaging” at NASA’s Langley Research Center, was arrested for lying to a federal officer on March 16, 2013 at Washington Dulles International Airport before returning to China. Jiang allegedly told the FBI that he was carrying fewer computer storage devices than he was. He was accused of espionage by Representative Frank Wolf, and was investigated for possible violations of the Arms Export Control Act.
An affidavit said that Jiang had previously brought a NASA laptop with sensitive information to China.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Lawrence Leonard ordered Jiang released after a federal prosecutor acknowledged that there was no evidence that he possessed sensitive, secret or classified material.
According to Jiang’s lawyer, Wolf made a “scapegoat” of his client.
On May 2, Jiang was cleared in federal court of the felony charge of lying to federal investigators.
HUA JUN ZHAO

Hua Jun Zhao, 42, was accused of stealing a cancer-research compound from a Medical College of Wisconsin office in Milwaukee in an attempt to deliver it to Zhejiang University, according to an FBI agent’s March 29, 2013 affidavit. Presiding judge Charles N. Clevert found no evidence that “Zhao had intended to defraud or cause any loss to Medical College of Wisconsin, or even to make money for himself”. Zhao was convicted for “accessing a computer without authorization and obtaining information worth more than $5,000” for accessing his research on university-owned computers after school officials seized his own laptop, portable memory devices and papers.
XIAFEN “SHERRY” CHEN

Xiafen “Sherry” Chen, 59, was a hydrologist for the federal government in Ohio. She was falsely accused of spying and arrested in October 2014.
She was originally charged with four felonies, including that she had illegally downloaded data about national infrastructure and made false statements to federal agents that she last saw a Chinese official in 2011, not 2012. Five months later, in March 2015, prosecutors dropped all charges against Mrs. Chen without explanation.
CHINESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The Ministry of State Security (中华人民共和国国家安全部), formerly a bureau of the Ministry of Public Security, received ministry status in June 1983.
The MSS is the principal Chinese agency responsible for intelligence collection and counterintelligence.According to Western intelligence sources, the MSS operates intelligence activities in more than 170 cities in nearly 50 countries through its Foreign Affairs Bureau.
According to Western intelligence sources, the MSS operates intelligence activities in more than 170 cities in nearly 50 countries through its Foreign Affairs Bureau.
MSS reach beyond China allows it to pursue Chinese dissidents in foreign countries and establish cover for Chinese diplomats and agents and the thousands of Chinese who travel to the U.S. as business representatives, or members of scientific, academic and cultural delegations.
Intelligence elements of the People’s Liberation Army include the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department (总参二部); the Third, or Electronic-warfare, Department (总参三部); the Fourth Department (总参四部), focusing on information warfare; the General Armaments and General Logistics Departments (总装备部及总后勤部), which train collectors, and the PLA General Political Department (总政治部).
The Political-Legal Leading Group (政法委) is a Communist Party agency under its Military Commission (responsible for internal order), whose responsibilities include overseeing intelligence and internal law enforcement.
The Investigations Department (监察部) is a Communist Party agency responsible for political investigations of party members.
The United Front Works Department (统战部) is a Communist Party agency responsible for handling Chinese who are citizens of other countries. Works Department personnel, stationed in Chinese embassies and consulates, attempt to influence important people of Chinese descent to follow Communist Party direction.
They also watch Chinese academics and scientists working in other countries to ensure they return to China.
The Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (国防科工委) sends agents to foreign countries as employees of front organizations to purchase defense equipment and technology whose export is restricted. Examples of Chinese cover organizations include New Era Corp. the CITIC Group and Poly Technologies.
OTHER CASES

In 2007 McAfee alleged that China was actively involved in cyberwarfare, accusing the country of cyber-attacks on India, Germany and the United States; China denied knowledge of these attacks.
In September 2007 former senior U.S. information security official Paul Strassmann said that 735,598 computers in the U.S. were “infested with Chinese zombies”; computers infected in this manner can theoretically form a botnet capable of carrying out unsophisticated yet potentially dangerous denial-of-service attacks.
A cyber spying network known as GhostNet, using servers primarily based in China, was reported as tapping into the classified documents of government and private organizations in 103 countries (including Tibetan exiles); China denied the claim.
In December 2009 and January 2010 a cyberattack, known as Operation Aurora, was launched from China on Google and over 20 other companies.
Google said that the attacks originated from China, and it would “review the feasibility” of its business operations in China as a result of the incident. According to Google, at least 20 other companies in a variety of sectors were also targeted by the attacks. According to McAfee, “this is the highest profile attack of its kind that we have seen in recent memory.”
In May 2014, a U.S. Federal grand jury indicted five Chinese military officers for cybercrimes and stealing trade secrets.
It was alleged that the Chinese officers hacked into computers of six U.S. companies to steal information that would provide an economic advantage to Chinese competitors, including Chinese state-owned enterprises. China said that the charges were “made-up”, and the indictment would damage trust between the two nations.
Although the indictments have been called relatively meaningless, they could limit travel by the officers due to U.S. extradition treaties.
EFFECT ON CHINESE AND ASIAN AMERICANS

The high-profile reporting of Chinese spy cases, especially these later found falsely accused, by the U.S. news media has raised concerns by civil-rights groups about the racial profiling of Chinese Americans as spies. In the Wen Ho Lee case, Lee’s attorneys said that the scientist was unfairly singled out by government investigators because of his ethnic background.
Bo Jiang’s case in 2013 was called by his lawyer as another example of witch-hunting Chinese spies.
Another Chinese American, Sherry Chen (aNational Weather Service employee in Ohio), was falsefully accused of spying on U.S. dams in 2014 after she contacted a former classmate—now a senior Chinese official—and advised him about finding information in the United States on how dams are financed.
Analyzing several recently similar accused Chinese American victims, a prominent Chinese-American and a member of the Committee of 100, Dr. George Koo wrote an article in 2015 warning that “Chinese Americans continue to be victimized by racial profiling”.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE

ASIA

INDIA

India has quietly informed companies to avoid using Chinese-made telecommunications equipment, fearing that it may have spy capabilities embedded within it. Also, India’s intelligence service, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) believes that China is using dozens of study centers that it has set up in Nepal near the Indian border in part for the purposes of spying on India.
In August 2011 a Chinese research vessel disguised as a fishing trawler was detected off the coast of Little Andaman, collecting data in a geostrategically sensitive region.
The “Luckycat” hacking campaign that targeted Japan and Tibet also targeted India.
A Trojan horse was inserted into a Microsoft Word file ostensibly about India’s ballistic missile defense program, allowing for the command and control servers to connect and extract information. The attacks were subsequently traced back to a Chinese graduate student from Sichuan and the Chinese government is suspected of planning the attacks.
JAPAN

According to a report by Trend Micro the “Luckycat” hacker group is engaged in cyber-espionage on targets in Japan, India and Tibet. During the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, the hackers inserted a Trojan virusinto PDF attachments to emails being circulated containing information about radiation dosage measurements.
The investigation into ownership of the command and control servers by Trend Micro and The New York Times linked the malware to Gu Kaiyuan, through QQ numbers and the alias “scuhkr”.
Mr. Gu is a former graduate student of the Information Security Institute of Sichuan University in Chengdu and wrote his master’s thesis on computer hacking.
James A. Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies believes the attacks were state-sponsored.
SRI LANKA

In Sri Lanka, Jayalalithaa Jayaram – head of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – stated that Chinese laborers working in parts of the country devastated by the Sri Lankan Civil War were infiltrated with Chinese spies on surveillance missions targeted at Tamil Nadu, India.
TAIWAN

The PRC and ROC regularly accuse each other of spying.
Presidential aide Wang Jen-ping was found in 2009 to have sold nearly 100 confidential documents to China since 2007; Military intelligence officer Lo Chi-cheng was found to have been acting as a double agent in 2010 for China since 2007; Maj. Gen. Lo Hsien-che, electronic communications and information bureau chief during the administration of former President Chen Shui-bian, has been suspected of selling military secrets to Mainland China since 2004.
In 2007 the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau stated that 500 gigabyte Maxtor Basics Personal Storage 3200 hard drives produced by Seagate Technology and manufactured in Thailand may have been modified by a Chinese subcontractor and shipped with the Virus.Win32.AutoRun.ah virus.
As many as 1,800 drives sold in the Netherlands and Taiwan after August 2007 were reportedly infected with the virus, which scanned for passwords for products such as World of Warcraft and QQ and uploading them to a website in Beijing.
HONG KONG

According to Falun Gong media The Epoch Times and Pan-democracy political groups, China has been sending spies into Hong Kong harassing dissents and Falun Gong practitioners. In 2012, according to Oriental Daily, a Chinese security ministry official has been arrested in Hong Kong on suspicion of acting as a double agent for the United States.
EUROPE

BELGIUM

Belgian Justice Minister Jo Vandeurzen accused the Chinese government of electronic espionage against the government of Belgium, while Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht informed the Belgian Federal Parliament that his ministry was hacked by Chinese agents. The espionage is possibly linked to Belgium hosting the headquarters of NATO and the European Union.
The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Leuven was also believed to be the center of a group of Chinese students in Europe conducting industrial espionage, operating under a front organization called The Chinese Students’ and Scholars’ Association of Leuven.
In 2005 a leading figure of the Association defected to Belgium, providing information to the Sûreté de l’Etat on hundreds of spies engaged in economic espionage across Europe.
The group had no obvious links to Chinese diplomats and was focused on getting moles into laboratories and universities in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, France and Belgium.
The People’s Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, dismissed the reports as fabrications triggered by fears of China’s economic development.
FRANCE

There have been several incidents of suspected Chinese spies in France. This includes Shi Pei Pu, a Chinese opera singer from Beijing who convinced a French diplomat that he was a woman, and spied on France.
French media also portrayed Li Li Whuang (李李), a 22-year-old Chinese intern at car parts maker Valeo, as an industrial spy.
Both the French prosecution and Valeo refuted media claims of spying and the case was later considered to be a psychosis.
Li Li was ultimately convicted of violating the confidentiality clause in her contract and served two months in prison, but was allowed to continue her doctoral studies at the University of Technology of Compiègne.
GERMANY

Germany suspects China of spying both on German corporations and on Uyghur expatriates living in the country.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior estimates that Chinese economic espionage could be costing Germany between 20 and 50 billion euros annually.
Spies are reportedly targeting mid- and small-scale companies that do not have as strong security regimens as larger corporations.
Berthold Stoppelkamp, head of the Working Group for Economic Security (ASW), stated that German companies had a poor security culture making espionage easier, exacerbated by the absence of a “strong, centralized” police command.
Walter Opfermann, a counter-intelligence expert for the state of Baden-Württemberg, claimed that China is using extremely sophisticated electronic attacks capable of endangering portions of critical German infrastructure, having gathered sensitive information through techniques such as phone hacking and Trojan emails.
Between August and September 2007 Chinese hackers have been suspected of using Trojan horse spyware on various government computers, including those of the Chancellory, the Ministry of Economics and Technology, and the Ministry of Education and Research.
Germans officials believe Trojan viruses were inserted in Microsoft Word and PowerPoint files, and approximately 160 gigabytes of data were siphoned to Canton, Lanzhou and Beijing via South Korea, on instructions from the People’s Liberation Army.
In 2011, a 64-year-old German man was charged with spying on Uighurs in Munich between April 2008 and October 2009.
Munich is a center for expatriate Uyghurs, and in November 2009 members of the Federal Criminal Police Office arrested four Chinese nationals on charges of spying on Uyghurs. In 2007 Chinese diplomat Ji Wumin left Germany after being observed meeting with individuals engaged in surveillance of Munich Uyghurs, and German investigators suspect China is coordinating espionage activities out of its Munich consulate in the Neuhausen district.
POLAND

In May 2009, Stefan Zielonka, a Polish cipher officer working for the Military Information Services, disappeared. He is suspected of providing the Chinese or Russian governments with Polish and NATO cryptography information.
Zielonka’s body was later retrieved from the Vistula river, although investigators remain uncertain as to whether Zielonka was attempting to defect or commit suicide, or whether the body retrieved actually was Zielonka’s.
RUSSIA

In December 2007, Igor Reshetin, the Chief Executive of Tsniimash-Export, and three researchers were sentenced to prison for passing on dual-purpose technology to the Chinese. Analysts speculated that the leaked technology could help China develop improved missiles and accelerate the Chinese space program.
In September 2010, the Russian Federal Security Service detained two scientists working at the Baltic State Technical University in Saint Petersburg. The two are charged with passing on classified information to China, possibly through the Harbin Engineering University.
SWEDEN

Babur Maihesuti, a Chinese Uighur who became a Swedish citizen was arrested for spying on the Uighur refugee communities in Sweden, Norway, Germany, and the United States, and ultimately sentenced for illegal espionage activity.
UNITED KINGDOM

UK officials, including experts at its MI5 intelligence agency, are fearful that China could shut down businesses in the nation with Chinese cyber attacks and spy equipment embedded in computer and telecommunications equipment.
NORTH AMERICA

CANADA

Newspapers have reported that China now has over a 1000 spies in Canada.
The head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Richard Fadden in a television interview warned that various Canadian politicians at provincial and municipal levels had ties to Chinese intelligence. In an interview, he said that some politicians were under the influence of the Chinese government, but had to withdraw the statement a few days later. It was directed at Chinese groups in Canada, and others, that he was referring to China because in the same interview he stressed the high level of Chinese spying in Canada.His statement was censored a few days later.
In 2012 Mark Bourrie, an Ottawa-based freelance journalist, stated that the State Council-run Xinhua News Agency asked him to collect information on the Dalai Lama through their Ottawa bureau chief, Dacheng Zhang, by exploiting his journalistic access to the Parliament of Canada.
Bourrie stated that he was asked to write for Xinhua in 2009 and sought advice from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), but was ignored. Bourrie was asked to collected information on the Sixth World Parliamentarians’ Convention on Tibet at the Ottawa Convention Centre, although Xinhua had no intention of writing a story on the proceedings. Bourrie stated that at that point “We were there under false pretenses, pretending to be journalists but acting as government agents.”
Xinhua collects extensive information on Tibetan and other Chinese dissidents in Canada and is accused of being engaged in espionage by Chinese defector Chen Yonglin and Reporters Without Borders.
UNITED STATES

China is suspected of having a long history of espionage in the United States against military and industrial secrets, often resorting to direct espionage, exploitation of commercial entities, and a network of scientific, academic, and business contacts. Several U.S. citizens have been convicted of spying for China. Naturalized citizen Dongfan Chung, an engineer working with Boeing, was the first person convicted under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. Chung is suspected of having passed on classified information on designs including the Delta IV rocket, F-15 Eagle, B-52 Stratofortress and the CH-46 and CH-47 helicopters.
China’s espionage and cyber attacks against the US government and business organizations are a major concern, according to the seventh annual report (issued Sept 2009) to the US Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
“Although attribution is a problem in cyber attacks, the scale and coordination of the attacks strongly indicates Chinese state involvement,” said commission vice chairman Larry Wortzel. “In addition to harming U.S. interests, Chinese human and cyber espionage activities provide China with a method for leaping forward in economic, technological, and military development.” The report cited that the number of cyber attacks from China against the US Department of Defense computer systems had grown from 43,880 in 2007 to 54,640 in 2008, a nearly 20 percent increase.
Reuters reported that the Commission found that the Chinese government has placed many of its computer network responsibilities under the direction of the People’s Liberation Army, and was using the data mostly for military purposes.
In response, China slammed the report as “full of prejudice,” and warning it could damage China-US relations. “We advise this so-called commission not to always view China through tinted glasses,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said.
In 2008 the Chinese government was accused of secretly copying information from the laptop of Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez during a trade mission to Beijing in order to gain information on American corporations.
The allegations were subsequently dismissed by Qin Gang, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
In response to these and other reports of cyberattacks by China against the United States, Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has suggested that China and the United States should agree to a policy of mutually assured restraint with respect to cyberspace. This would involve allowing both states to take the measures they deem necessary for their self-defense while simultaneously agreeing to refrain from taking offensive steps; it would also entail vetting these commitments.
OCEANIA

AUSTRALIA

Australia believes that Chinese have been spying on Australian businesses.
A male Chinese student from Fujian was granted a protection visa by the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia after revealing that he had been instructed to spy on Australian targets in exchange for an overseas scholarship, reporting to the Ministry of State Security.
Reported targets included Chinese students with anti-Communist sentiments and Falun Gong practitioners.
Nicola Roxon, the Attorney-General of Australia, blocked the Shenzhen-based corporation Huawei from seeking a supply contract for the National Broadband Network, on the advice of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
The Australian government feared Huawei would provide backdoor access for Chinese cyber espionage.
The Chinese government is suspected of orchestrating an attack on the email network used by the Parliament of Australia, allowing unauthorized access to thousands of emails and compromising the computers of several senior Australian politicians including Prime Minister Julia Gillard, Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, and Minister of Defense Stephen Smith.
SOUTH AMERICA

Experts believe that China has recently increased its spy capabilities in South America, perhaps with help from the Cuban government.
PERU

The computer security firm ESET reported that tens of thousands of blueprints were stolen from Peruvian corporations through malware, which were traced to Chinese e-mail accounts. This was done through an AutoCAD worm called ACAD/Medre.A, written in AutoLISP, which located AutoCAD files, at which point they were sent to QQ and 163.com email accounts in China.
ESET researcher Righard Zwienenberg claimed this was Chinese industrial espionage.

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Post: # 161550Unread post Gary Oak »

Of course liberals are far above caring about any damage Chinese do against Canada the west and the USA especially or who dies. The highest ranking Chinese that the British would allow in the Hong Kong was and is a spy for China. He probably has Canadian citizenship too.

Spies/Moles: Helped China Foil ALL of the US/CIA Operations

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Post: # 161962Unread post Gary Oak »

It is well known that Huawei is in tight and work hand in glove with Chinese espionage. Justin Trudeau deciding to trust Huawei is simply traitorious. Canada's entire Chinese population knows this too and none of them are warning us.

Huawei's latest attempt to enter U.S. worries lawmakers — but Canada doesn't share its concern

How 2 allies have responded to concerns the Chinese phone maker is a national security threat
Jan 19, 2018
For the past decade, Chinese tech company Huawei has found no shortage of success in Canada. Its equipment is used in telecommunications infrastructure run by the country's major carriers, and some have sold Huawei's phones.
The company has struck up partnerships with Canadian universities, and say it is investing more than half a billion dollars in researching next generation cellular networks here.
But in the U.S., there have long been worries that the company could be used as vehicle for Chinese spying, and its attempts to gain a foothold in the U.S. market have been stymied at nearly every opportunity.
The latest slight for Huawei: AT&T was expected to sell Huawei's new flagship smartphones, the Mate 10 and Mate 10 Pro, later this year. But the partnership was scuttled at the last minute. Reuters, citing unnamed sources, reported that lawmakers had lobbied federal regulators to oppose the plan, and as a result AT&T abandoned the deal. Publicly, national security concerns were to blame.
'There are no secrets. There can't be any secrets.'
— Scott Bradley, Huawei Canada
Those concerns are not without precedent. China has been accused on numerous occasions of launching cyberattacks for the purpose of corporate espionage. In 2014 the U.S. government charged members of the Chinese military with hacking into American corporations, and a former Nortel employee believes the country's spies hid within the former Canadian telecommunications giant's networks for years.
But in the case of Huawei, without concrete public evidence of spying, some observers believe the latest accusations may be less about national security, and more about the U.S. protecting its own interests — both in the face of worsening trade relations between the two powers, and China's aspirations to be a world leader in high-tech industries like robotics and AI — with the U.S. taking whatever opportunities it has to push back.
CHINA HUAWEI
Huawei has long denied that it has ties to the Chinese government and has repeatedly pushed back against allegations that it poses a threat to national security. (Qilai Shen/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
"National security is often a stalking horse or an excuse for what maybe are trade or competitive issues," said Lawrence Surtees, a vice president at market intelligence firm IDC, who leads its research on the Canadian telecom industry.
He noted that the U.S. has used the same excuse in the past to prevent foreign powers from obtaining advanced Western technology. And given that two of America's closest partners — Canada and the U.K. — have given Huawei a greenlight to sell telecom equipment and phones, it's hard to know how serious any national security claims truly are.
Nevertheless: "I think the reality is often more complicated than either-or," said Surtees. "And, in this case, both are possibly true."
'THERE ARE NO SECRETS'
U.S. lawmakers have "long been concerned about Chinese espionage in general, and Huawei's role in that espionage in particular," according to a letter to regulators obtained by the New York Times this month. Those concerns are perhaps best embodied by a Congressional report from 2012, which warned U.S. companies against using equipment made by Chinese telecom equipment makers such as Huawei and ZTE.
Although no evidence of spying was found, suspicions have lingered all the same.
Just this week, U.S. lawmakers introduced a new bill proposing that phones made by both Huawei and ZTE be banned from use by U.S. government agencies, while suggesting that companies who want to do business with the government in the future cut their own Huawei ties.
For its part, Huawei has long denied that it has ties to the Chinese government — the company was founded by a former military engineer— and has repeatedly pushed back against allegations that it poses a threat to national security.
"We work openly and transparently with the government of Canada. There are no secrets. There can't be any secrets," said Scott Bradley, Huawei Canada's vice-president of corporate affairs. "I would think our track record of being here for ten years in Canada speaks for itself."
98975215
Despite the fallout with AT&T, Huawei has no plans to sell its latest phones in Canada. But two high-end phones released early last year, the P10 and P10+, are currently sold through Bell and Rogers. This Mate 10 Pro is available in the U.K. (David Becker/Getty Images)
Both Public Safety and Innovation Canada directed questions to Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the country's electronic spy agency agency. While CSE provides security advice and guidance to Canadian companies, it is is "unable to comment on specific companies, products or providers," wrote spokesperson Ryan Foreman in an email.
Bell spokesperson Marc Choma provided a one-line statement, writing "Huawei is a long time Bell partner and one of a wide range of wireless infrastructure and device providers we work with."
Rogers, Telus, and Freedom Mobile did not respond to a request for comment.
'YOU CAN'T ALWAYS SAY NO'
Where there have been concerns, two of the U.S.' closest partners seem to have found ways to manage them.
"I think most people involved in technology think that there are ways you can actually work with Huawei — or any such company — and not have massive security concerns," said Ian Bremmer, founder of the political consultancy firm the Eurasia group.
To address the UK's concerns, Huawei created the arms-length Huawei Cybersecurity Evaluation Center in 2010, where technicians with top government security clearance scrutinize the company's hardware and software for vulnerabilities or backdoors. The center is overseen by a board that includes members of Britain's signals intelligence agency GCHQ and British telecom providers, and its performance and independence from Huawei are subject to an annual external audit.
The oversight board's most recent report, published last year, concluded that "any risks to UK national security from Huawei's involvement in the UK's critical networks have been sufficiently mitigated."
CES 2018
Despite lacking the support of a major carrier, Huawei is still planning to sell its latest phones, the Mate 10 and Mate 10 Pro, direct to consumers in the U.S. through its website. (David Paul Morris/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
And in Canada, technology lawyer Imran Ahmad suggested there may be a similar logic behind the company basing some of its research and development operations here, rather than entirely overseas, where it would be harder to hold Huawei to account if necessary.
"I think it's a sign that if it's being done here, there's some Canadian standards which are going to be applied in terms of best practices," said Ahmad, a partner at the firm Miller Thomson.
Not only has the company been allowed to sell its products and services in Canada, but since 2008 it has created a number of research and development hubs and forged multiple academic partnerships — ostensibly, giving the government the ability to keep a closer eye on the company's activities when it feels the need, while still staying on good diplomatic terms.
"Sometimes with China you have to pick your battles," says Stephanie Carvin — an assistant professor of international affairs at Carleton University and a former national security analyst with the government of Canada — who notes that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is trying to improve ties with China, and would be unlikely to publicly reproach Huawei if the government does have concerns.
"It's a major global force. It's seeing itself increasingly as having a global role. Canada is going to have to deal with China regardless. And you can't always say no all the time."

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Post: # 163725Unread post Gary Oak »

I met the highest ranking chinese that the British would allow in thei Hong Kong military before handover during my third surprise dinner with the Wo Shing Yi dragonhead so obviously he was an agent and traitor too. How many spies are in the Canadian military I wonder ? Could it be all of the Chinese in the Canadian military ?

The Rising Tide of China's Human Intelligence

On Jan. 15, FBI agents arrested Jerry Chun Shing Lee, a former CIA case officer, and charged him with unlawful retention of classified information. Lee is the sixth person charged by the Justice Department in the past two years for espionage-related offenses suspected to have been conducted on behalf of the People’s Republic of China. By comparison, prior to 2015, only one or two people on average per year were arrested for such offenses. The increased frequency of arrests—coinciding with a public March 2016 announcement by the Chinese government that intelligence efforts would be more heavily resourced—may indicate that China is scaling up traditional human intelligence efforts against the United States government.
Lee’s arrest seemingly stemmed from FBI agents’ discovery of classified information in his notebooks in 2012. The nature of that information—the identities, telephone numbers, and activities of CIA informants in China—has led intelligence officials to suspect Lee of exposing dozens of informants reportedly killed, imprisoned, or forced to become double agents by Chinese intelligence services since 2010.
Lee may have been one of the Chinese government’s most valuable spies in decades. But there are many other examples of Chinese intelligence efforts to recruit American informants. In June 2017, the Justice Department charged former State Department employee Kevin Mallory with providing classified information to Chinese intelligence officers in exchange for cash. In March 2017, the department charged State Department employee Candace Marie Claiborne with obstruction of justice and making false statements related to her contacts with Chinese intelligence officers, who lavished her with cash and gifts. In June 2016, former IBM employee Xu Jiaqiang was charged with economic espionage on behalf of China—two months after nuclear engineer Szuhsiung Ho was charged with conspiracy to act as an agent of the Chinese government. And in March 2016, the Justice Department charged FBI employee Kun Shan Chun with acting as a Chinese agent, having supplied sensitive information to Chinese intelligence officers in exchange for cash.
These cases might seem like relatively run-of-the-mill espionage and counterespionage affairs. However, over the last few years, the Communist Party has clearly turned its attention to both military and civilian intelligence reform, including the creation of a foreign-intelligence-focused entity. Moreover, the recent uptick in arrests comes against a baseline of historically limited Chinese human intelligence activity directed at foreigners. Chinese intelligence services have long co-opted the growing number of Chinese nationals living and traveling abroad for intelligence purposes, in part due to reduced risk. By leveraging a large network of individuals to each collect small pieces of information, the risk of detection and prosecution was diminished. But stealing valuable military and intelligence information requires the recruitment of American spies with privileged access to such information and in positions of scrutiny by U.S. counterintelligence entities—a far riskier proposition for China, potentially leading to embarrassment and international incidents. Thus far, that risk has made the relative anonymity of other espionage tools, such as cyber intrusions, more attractive for stealing government secrets.
So why does China appear to have stepped up this riskier form of human intelligence now? What’s changed?
The latest human intelligence campaign coincides with a decade of growing strategic competition between China and the U.S. for influence in the Asia-Pacific region, characterized by confrontational statements by both sides over trade, North Korea, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and more. The establishment of Chinese military bases in the South China Sea, U.S. naval freedom of navigation operations, China’s declaration of air defense identification zones, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and potential U.S. military action in North Korea have all raised the risk of miscalculation by either the U.S. or China, which in turn has motivated China to redouble efforts to better understand U.S. military capabilities, readiness, intentions, and decision-making regarding any future crisis. And to assess intentions and decision-making, few tools are as effective as human intelligence.
For this reason, the past ten years have given China a strong incentive to increase human intelligence directed towards U.S. government employees in order to avoid a catastrophic confrontation with the United States. And alongside this new incentive, several factors have combined to benefit Chinese intelligence services and enable the growth of the country’s human intelligence operations.
First, the free movement of people and information throughout the globalized world facilitates human intelligence collection targeting Americans. During the Cold War, few Americans and Chinese traveled between their respective countries. It was difficult for American agents of Chinese intelligence services to travel to or from the China without being caught. This intensified the risk of information and money transactions between countries.
Since the Cold War, however, such barriers have largely fallen. The number of Chinese visitors to the U.S. surged sixteen-fold to almost four million between 2002 and 2017. In addition, immigration from the China to the U.S. has increased from less than 40,000 annually in the late 1980s to almost 75,000 annually in 2015. Of course, the vast majority of such travel and immigration is benign. But the practical challenge of mounting an effective and continuous counterintelligence response to such a large influx of people creates an opening for foreign intelligence activity.
Second, the economic relationship between the U.S. and China enables Chinese human intelligence collection intertwined with legitimate business activities. Since Deng Xiaoping opened China to foreign businesses, U.S. and Chinese companies have become significantly more globalized in their operations and investments. China is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner. Despite rising manufacturing costs, many U.S. companies still depend on China for production, especially for advanced technology. Although entanglement—the interdependence between China and the U.S. that makes harm inflicted on the U.S. also impose costs on China—may prevent Chinese intelligence services from seeking to damage the U.S. economy, it also facilitates espionage by increasing access to people and information. Equally importantly, entanglement raises the costs for U.S. decision-makers contemplating counterintelligence measures. For example, due to the competing priorities of economic growth and foreign policy objectives like North Korean denuclearization, the U.S. government may be less likely to expel Chinese citizens suspected of espionage activity in the U.S.
Third, advances in technology and communication have empowered human intelligence operations broadly. Modern technology makes it much easier for foreign intelligence services to communicate with their informants in the U.S. from afar. Kevin Mallory, for example, transmitted classified documents to his Chinese handlers using an encrypted communication device; it was not until the device itself was searched by investigators that proof of information transmission was found.
Finally, additional factors impede counterintelligence efforts against Chinese espionage. The increasing number and scale of counterintelligence threats in the U.S. has made the job of counterintelligence and law enforcement officials significantly more difficult, the most obvious challenge being the proliferation of adversaries with an increasingly complex array of espionage tools at their disposal. In 1985, the former Soviet Union was the United States’ most capable and active adversary. Today, the U.S. faces both Russia—which has largely maintained the capabilities developed by the Soviet Union—and China, whose intelligence services have developed capabilities that compare to those of Russia. Meanwhile, Chinese intelligence services have adopted effective Russian tactics while developing others of their own. And in addition to the growing number and scope of counterintelligence threats, other national security threats like terrorism have captured the focus, resources, and attention of the U.S. intelligence community. These problems have generated a division of resources and focus that in turn have led to a lack of coordination by U.S. government agencies.
Faced with a heightened scope of Chinese human intelligence operations, how is the U.S. to best respond? The sophisticated tradecraft associated with espionage makes it challenging for U.S. law enforcement officers to collect evidence sufficient for espionage prosecution. However, prosecutors and investigators have more thanespionage laws at their disposal depending on available evidence. They can charge suspected spies with acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, mishandling or disclosing classified information, false official statements, and obstruction of justice, to name a few. By comparison, computer fraud, theft, economic espionage, and other charges are particularly useful for prosecuting cyberespionage, as demonstrated by the Justice Department’s unusual decision to charge People’s Liberation Army hackers directly in 2014.
But the toughest obstacles facing the enforcement of espionage laws in the U.S. involve the law enforcement apparatus itself. During the Cold War, the activities of foreign intelligence services captured the attention and emphasis of law enforcement and the broader national security establishment. Today, they are a smaller part of a broad and competing array of threats that have diverted resources and focus elsewhere. In the 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Union and the proliferation of nuclear weapons led to the rise of counterproliferation as a priority focus for many U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. After 9/11, the rapid growth of counterterrorism as a focus further crowded competing priorities for agencies like the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon. And most recently, the threat of cyberespionage and cyberattacks have consumed yet even more bandwidth of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Overall funding dedicated to national security, intelligence, and law enforcement activities has grown since its relative low in the period between the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks. But this growing pie has been divided between more and more actors, and the result is that the same agencies devoted primarily to counterintelligence in 1985 find themselves atrophied and spread thin in 2018.
The U.S. government has also faced difficulty educating Americans and American businesses about foreign intelligence services’ efforts to steal information and recruit informants. Such initiatives are not without countervailing risks to society—the paranoia advocated during McCarthyism and the activities of the intelligence community during the J. Edgar Hoover era are clear examples. But the efficacy of recent efforts made by the U.S. government has been limited at best. Considering that counterintelligence awareness programs have focused on reporting and investigation rather than prevention, the U.S. government may be forced to step up its efforts to engage society proactively rather than reactively.
Ultimately, while escalated espionage activity is concerning for national security, two things have made the latest trend particularly worrisome for the United States. The national security ramifications of breaches involving Americans in the most sensitive positions are significant—rivalling some of the worst damage ever caused, such as that by Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen—but they also come at a time of immense strategic importance as Sino-U.S. tensions intensify. The damage caused by Ames and Hanssen occurred when their espionage patrons, the Soviet Union and later Russia, were in strategic decline that dampened the lasting effects of their espionage. But China-U.S. competition is anything but in decline, and the stakes could not be higher for both sides.

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Post: # 165076Unread post Gary Oak »

These are just the ones caught. China has a huge number information gathering networks all over the world. Even in small towns there will be at least one Chinese store ,restaraunt etc.... and they will be looking for any information of use to China. This isn't very appreciative towards the host nations at all.

Chinese spy cases in the United States

Cases of individuals spying on the United States of America on behalf of the intelligence services of the People's Republic of China.
CONTENTS
LARRY WU-TAI CHIN EDIT
Larry Wu-Tai Chin worked in the U.S. intelligence community for nearly 35 years while providing China with classified information.[1] Chin was recruited as a spy by a Chinese Communist official in 1948; an interpreter at the U.S. consulate in Shanghai,[2] he was later hired by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service. After he became an American citizen in 1965 he was transferred to Arlington, Virginia, where he had access to reports from intelligence agents abroad and translations of documents acquired by CIA officers in China.[2] Chin sold classified National Intelligence Estimates pertaining to China and Southeast Asia to China,[2] enabling the country to discover weaknesses in its intelligence agencies and compromise U.S. intelligence activities in the region. He provided sensitive information about Richard Nixon’s plans for normalizing relations with China two years before the president visited the country. In February 1986, Chin was convicted of 17 counts of espionage, conspiracy and tax evasion, but committed suicide before he could be sentenced.[2]
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KATRINA LEUNG EDIT
In 1982 FBI special agent James Smith recruited Katrina Leung, a 28-year-old Chinese immigrant, to work in Chinese counterintelligence.[3]Leung, a prominent business consultant, was valued for her contacts with high-level Chinese officials.[2] Smith and Leung became involved in a sexual relationship lasting nearly two decades.[3] At this time, Smith made classified documents available to Leung; she copied them,[3]providing China with information on nuclear, military and political issues.[4] Another FBI agent, William Cleveland, also became sexually involved with Leung.[3]
Image result for Katrina Leung, a 28-year-old Chinese immigrant, to work in Chinese counterintelligence.
PETER LEE EDIT
Lee, a physicist born in China who worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and later for TRW Inc., pleaded guilty to lying on security-clearance forms and passing classified national-defense information to Chinese scientists on business trips to Beijing.[5] He compromised classified weapons information, microwave submarine-detection technology and other national-defense data,[2] and the Department of Energy later concluded that his disclosure of classified information "was of significant material assistance to the PRC in their nuclear weapons development program ... This analysis indicated that Dr. Lee's activities have directly enhanced the PRC nuclear weapons program to the detriment of U.S. national security."[2]
Image result for Chinese intelligence operations worldwide
CHI MAK EDIT
Chi Mak is a Chinese-born engineer who worked for L-3 Communications, a California-based defense contractor,[6] as a support engineer on Navy quiet-drive propulsion technology.[6] According to recovered documents, he was instructed by his Chinese contacts to join "more professional associations and participate in more seminars with 'special subject matters' and to compile special conference materials on disk".[6] He was instructed to gather information on space-based electromagnetic intercept systems, space-launched magnetic-levitation platforms, electromagnetic gun or artillery systems, submarine torpedoes, electromagnetic launch systems, aircraft carrier electronic systems, water-jet propulsion, ship submarine propulsion, power-system configuration technology, weapons-system modularization, technologies to defend against nuclear attack, shipboard electromagnetic motor systems, shipboard internal and external communications systems and information on the next generation of U.S. destroyers.[6] He copied and sent sensitive documents on U.S. Navy ships, submarines and weapons to China by courier. In 2008, he was sentenced to a ​24 1⁄2-year prison term for espionage.[7]
Chi Mak How the FBI Cracked a Chinese Spy Ring The New Yorker
MOO KO-SUEN EDIT
In May 2006, Ko-Suen (Bill) Moo pleaded guilty to being a covert agent of China. Moo attempted to purchase United States military equipment to send to China when he was arrested by undercover United States agents. Some of the equipment included an F-16 fighter jet engine, an AGM-129A cruise missile, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter engines and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles.[8]
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WEN HO LEE EDIT
Wen Ho Lee is a Taiwanese-American scientist who worked for the University of California at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He created simulations of nuclear explosions for the purpose of scientific inquiry and to improve the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In December 1999, a federal grand jury indicted him of stealing secrets about the arsenal for China.
After federal investigators could not prove the initial accusations, the government conducted a separate investigation. It could only charge Lee with improper handling of restricted data, part of the original 59-count indictment to which he pleaded guilty as part of a plea bargain. In June 2006, Lee received $1.6 million from the federal government and five media organizations as partial settlement of a civil suit he filed against them for leaking his name to the press before charges were filed against him. According to Lee, federal judge James A. Parker apologized for denying him bail and putting him in solitary confinement.[citation needed]
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FEI YE AND MING ZHONG EDIT
Fei Ye, a U.S. citizen; and Ming Zhong, a permanent resident of the United States; were arrested at the San Francisco International Airport on November 23, 2001. They were accused of stealing trade secrets in designing a computer microprocessor to benefit China, although prosecutors did not allege that the Chinese government knew of their activities. In December 2002, they were charged with a total of ten counts, including conspiracy; economic espionage; possession of stolen trade secrets; and foreign transportation of stolen property. In 2006 (five years after their arrest), they pleaded guilty to two counts each of economic espionage. In 2008, they were sentenced to a year in prison. The maximum sentence is 30 years however prosecutors asked for less because of their cooperation. The case resulted in the first convictions under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.[9][10]


ANNE LOCKWOOD, MICHAEL HAEHNEL, AND FUPING LIU EDIT
In February 2009, three former employees of Metaldyne Corporation were sentenced to prison terms in federal court in connection with a conspiracy to steal confidential information from the company, according to Acting United States Attorney Terrence Berg. Anne Lockwood, formerly a Vice President for Sales at Metaldyne, her husband Michael Haehnel, formerly a senior engineer at Metaldyne, and Fuping Liu, a former metallurgist for Metaldyne [11]. Lockwood and Liu both pleaded guilty on September 15, 2008 to the main count of the Indictment, conspiracy to steal confidential and proprietary information belonging to Metaldyne, and using the stolen information in order to assist a Chinese competitor, the Chongqing Huafu Industry Company, (“Huafu”) of Chongqing, China to compete against Metaldyne in the field of powdered metal parts. Haehnel pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense charging him with unlawfully accessing stored electronic records [12]. Beginning in May of 2004, Lockwood and Liu developed a business plan to help Huafu compete against Metaldyne in the production of powdered metal products. Lockwood obtained both electronic and paper copies of confidential and proprietary information pertaining to Metaldyne’s internal costs and its manufacturing processes, and then provided some of that information to Huafu, in China, to assist it in competing against Metaldyne. Lockwood received 30 months in prison, Haehnel received 6 months in prison, and Liu received 9 months [13].
Image result for Anne Lockwood, Michael Haehnel, and Fuping Liu

BO JIANG EDIT
Bo Jiang, a researcher working on "source code for high technology imaging" at NASA's Langley Research Center, was arrested for lying to a federal officer on March 16, 2013 at Washington Dulles International Airport before returning to China. Jiang allegedly told the FBI that he was carrying fewer computer storage devices than he was. He was accused of espionage by Representative Frank Wolf, and was investigated for possible violations of the Arms Export Control Act.[14] An affidavit said that Jiang had previously brought a NASA laptop with sensitive information to China.[15]
U.S. Magistrate Judge Lawrence Leonard ordered Jiang released after a federal prosecutor acknowledged that there was no evidence that he possessed sensitive, secret or classified material.[16] According to Jiang's lawyer, Fernando Groene — a former federal prosecutor who practices out of Williamsburg, Wolf made a "scapegoat" of his client.[17] On May 2, Jiang was cleared in federal court of the felony charge of lying to federal investigators.[18][19]
Bo Jiang's profile at Linkedin
HUA JUN ZHAO EDIT
Hua Jun Zhao, 42, was accused of stealing a cancer-research compound from a Medical College of Wisconsin office in Milwaukee in an attempt to deliver it to Zhejiang University, according to an FBI agent’s March 29, 2013 affidavit.[20] Presiding judge Charles N. Clevert found no evidence that "Zhao had intended to defraud or cause any loss to Medical College of Wisconsin, or even to make money for himself".[21]Zhao was convicted for "accessing a computer without authorization and obtaining information worth more than $5,000" for accessing his research on university-owned computers after school officials seized his own laptop, portable memory devices and papers.[22]
Image result for Medical College of Wisconsin office in Milwaukee
WALTER LIEW AKA LIU YUANXUAN EDIT
In July 2014, Walter Lian-Heen Liew (aka Liu Yuanxuan) was sentenced to serve 15 years in prison for violations of the Economic Espionage Act, tax evasion, bankruptcy fraud, and obstruction of justice. Liew was convicted in March 2014 on each of the twenty counts charged. His company was found by the jury to steal trade secrets from E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company to state-owned companies of China, Pangang Group companies.[23]
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GUOQING CAO AND SHUYU LI EDIT
Two former Eli Lilly and Co. employees, Guoqing Cao and Shuyu Li, were arrested in Oct 2013 under the charges of theft and conspiracy to commit theft involving drugs that Lilly was developing. The indictment alleged Cao and Li emailed sensitive experimental drug information worth $55 Million to a competing Chinese drug company. U.S. Attorney Joe Hogsett and his deputy, Cynthia Ridgeway characterized the case as "a crime against the nation" and called the defendants as "traitors". In December, 2014, the U.S. attorney's office dropped charges "in the interests of justice".[24][25]

XIAFEN "SHERRY" CHEN EDIT
Xiafen "Sherry" Chen, 59, was a hydrologist for the federal government in Ohio. She was falsely accused of spying and arrested in October 2014.[26] She was originally charged with four felonies, including that she had illegally downloaded data about national infrastructure and made false statement of telling federal agents that she last seen a Chinese official in 2011, not 2012. Five months later (in March 2015), persuaded by a lawyer, Peter R. Zeidenberg, a partner at Arent Fox in Washington, prosecutors dropped all charges against Mrs. Chen without explanation.[27]
Image result for Eli Lilly and Co. employe, Guoqing Cao spy charges
XIAOXING XI EDIT
In May 2015, the United States Department of Justice accused Temple University professor Xiaoxing Xi of sending restricted American technology to China, specifically, the design of a pocket heater used in superconductor research. Xi was arrested by about a dozen FBIagents at his home, and faced charges carrying a maximum penalty of 80 years in prison and a $1 million fine.[28][29] In September 2015, however, the DOJ dropped all charges against him after leading scientists, including a co-inventor of the pocket heater, provided affidavitsthat the schematics that Xi shared with Chinese scientists were not restricted technology, and not for a pocket heater.[28][29] According to Xi's lawyer Peter Zeidenberg, the government did not understand the complicated science and failed to consult with experts before arresting him.[28] He said that the information Xi shared, as part of "typical academic collaboration", was about a different device, which Xi co-invented and is not restricted technology.[30]
Image result for Xiaoxing Xi spy
SZUHSIUNG "ALLEN" HO EDIT
Szuhsiung Ho, aka Allen Ho, 66, a naturalized U.S. citizen, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to unlawfully engage or participate in the production or development of special nuclear material outside the U.S., without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in violation of the Atomic Energy Act [31]. On April 2016, a federal grand jury issued a two-count indictment against Ho; China General Nuclear Power Company (CGNPC), the largest nuclear power company in China, and Energy Technology International (ETI), a Delaware corporation. At the time of the indictment Ho was a nuclear engineer, employed as a consultant by CGNPC and was also the owner of ETI. CGNPC specialized in the development and manufacture of nuclear reactors and was controlled by China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. Born in China, Ho is a naturalized U.S. citizen with dual residency in Delaware and China [32].
Image result for Szuhsiung "Allen" Ho

EDWARD C. LIN EDIT
Naval officer Lt. Cmdr. Edward C. Lin will serve six years in prison for mishandling classified information in an attempt to impress women[33]. Lin pleaded guilty in May 2017 to mishandling classified information and not reporting foreign contacts relating to his disclosure of secrets to a Taiwanese woman working for a political party and an undercover female FBI agent. He thought the agent, known as Katherine Wu, was a teacher in the middle of a turbulent marriage and decided to share classified info with her in August and September 2015 to impress her [34]. After an investigation beginning in January 2014, authorities arrested him in September 2015 as he was on his way to meet a woman in China. The investigation found that Lin did not report ties to Taiwanese naval officers or his relationships with Chinese women. He met one of the women at a massage parlor in Honolulu. When Navy Lt. Cmdr. Edward Lin was first arrested at the Honolulu airport in 2015 on a flight to China, military investigators thought they had uncovered an espionage case of epic proportions – a Mandarin-speaking Asian-American military officer accused of leaking highly sensitive U.S. military secrets to Chinese and Taiwanese officials [35].
Image result for Edward C. Lin

KUN SHAN CHUN EDIT
In January 2017, Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mary B. McCord, Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security, and William F. Sweeney Jr., Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced that Kun Shan Chun, a/k/a “Joey Chun,” was sentenced to serve 24 months in prison and pay a $10,000 fine based on his conviction for acting in the United States as an agent of the People’s Republic of China (“China”), without providing prior notice to the Attorney General. CHUN pled guilty on August 1, 2016[36]. U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero imposed today’s sentence. Kun Chun, a native of China and naturalized U.S. citizen, worked as an FBI Technician since 1997 and had Top Secret clearance.[37]
Image result for Kun Shan Chun

CANDACE MARIE CLAIBORNE EDIT
On March 28, 2017, The F.B.I. arrested a veteran State Department employee who concealed her extensive contacts with Chinese intelligence agents, who for years lavished her with thousands of dollars in gifts. Candace Marie Claiborne, 60, of Washington, was charged with felony obstruction and lying to the F.B.I. after her ties to the Chinese were uncovered, the authorities said. Prosecutors did not disclose where or when the Chinese first approached Ms. Claiborne, but did reveal she had once served in Beijing and Shanghai [38]. “Candace Marie Claiborne is a U.S. State Department employee who possesses a Top Secret security clearance and allegedly failed to report her contacts with Chinese foreign intelligence agents who provided her with thousands of dollars of gifts and benefits,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General McCord. “Claiborne used her position and her access to sensitive diplomatic data for personal profit. Pursuing those who imperil our national security for personal gain will remain a key priority of the National Security Division.”[39]
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KEVIN MALLORY EDIT
In June 2017, Kevin Patrick Mallory was arrested and charged under the Espionage Act on charges of performing espionage on behalf of the Chinese government.[40][41] Mallory allegedly was given special communications devices for communicating documents to Chinese intelligence agents, including documents classified as Top Secret.[40][42] The individuals alleged to be working for China's intelligence services represented themselves as working for the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.[41][43] Some of the material in his possession is alleged to contain sensitive information on human intelligence sources.[44]
Mallory graduated from Brigham Young University in 1981, and resided in Leesburg, Virginia.[43][45] Prior to his arrest, Mallory had served in the United States Army and worked as a Special Agent for the Diplomatic Security Service from 1987 to 1990.[46][40] Mallory worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency at some point in his career.[44] He was a self-employed consultant for GlobalEx, LLC.[47][41] Mallory had previously worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (as a case officer between 1990 and 1996, and as a contractor between 2010 and 2012) and at the American Institute in Taiwan.[44][45][48]
On July 7, 2017, During preliminary court proceedings, U.S. District Judge T. S. Ellis III ordered Mallory's bond revoked, judging him to be a flight risk and a potential threat to national security. The FBI cracked his cell phone and retrieved eight documents, some of which were top secret. In a call to his son, he had attempted to arrange to secrete case evidence in his home.[49]
Image result for kevin mallory spy
JERRY CHUN SHING LEE EDIT
In January 2018, the F.B.I. arrested former C.I.A. officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee, charging him with unlawful possession of defense information. He may have compromised the identities of numerous CIA spies in China.[50][51]
Image result for jerry chun shing lee in hong kong

XU JIAQIANG EDIT
Xu Jiaqiang plead guilty to charges of economic espionage, theft, and possession and distribution of trade secrets, after having been accused of stealing the source code to IBM software, with the intention of benefiting the National Health and Family Planning Commission.[52][53] On January 18, 2018, Xu was sentenced to five years in prison by District Judge Kenneth M. Karas [54]. Xu previously pled guilty to all six counts with which he was charged.
Image result for Xu Jiaqiang

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Post: # 166495Unread post Gary Oak »

China has done this in all nations. They have made far more headway in Canada and Australia because of our small populations. They work together in their "fan Qing fu Ming" sworn tongs.

China Built an Army of Influence Agents in the U.S
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The Russians may be getting all the attention for influencing American opinion and policy. But Beijing has been at it for decades.

In May, a classified Australian government report revealed that the Chinese Communist Party had spent the last decade attempting to influence every level of that nation’s government and politics.

“Unlike Russia, which seems to be as much for a good time rather than a long time, the Chinese are strategic, patient, and they set down foundations of organizations and very consistent narratives over a long period of time,” said the author of the report in March.


“They put an enormous amount of effort into making sure we don’t talk about what it’s doing.”

Commissioned by Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull in the wake of a series of Chinese influence scandals that rocked Australian politics last year, the report, compiled under the auspices of an intelligence agency, examined Chinese attempts to influence politicians, political donations, media, and academia.

But such a report could easily be written about the United States—and may soon be. U.S. intelligence agencies have long tracked Beijing’s clandestine attempts at political influence inside the United States.

And they don’t like what they see. One former CIA analyst put it bluntly: Beijing’s agents in this country aim “to turn Americans against their own government’s interests and their society’s interests.”

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Unlike Australia, however, American society has yet to engage in a broad public debate about the issue. Most Americans have never even heard of the main conduit of such influence, an obscure but sprawling Chinese Communist Party agency known as the United Front.

The organization has been around in one form or another since the World War II era. Mao famously referred to the United Front as one of the Communist Party’s “magic weapons.” These days, United Front operations sometimes resemble the CIA’s soft attempts to buy off, co-opt, or coerce influential community leaders. Sometimes it functions like a booster club for pro-party locals, or like an advocacy group trying to sway public opinion. Sometimes it works in concert with China’s traditional intelligence agencies, such as the Ministry of State Security, to gather information or apply pressure. And United Front networks may sometimes play a role in facilitating intellectual property theft and soft intelligence collection, though that role isn’t always clear.

What is clear is that the United Front is active in dozens of U.S. cities and has been for years, with almost no one the wiser.

Standing in front of a ruby-red backdrop, a Chinese diplomat’s hand resting lighting on her lower back, He Xiaohui looked radiant. The Chinese-American woman, a local activist in Maryland politics, had just been appointed president of the National Association for China’s Peaceful Unification in Washington, D.C., which describes itself as a non-profit for Chinese-Americans dedicated to the eventual unification of China with Taiwan.

He Xiaohui posed for a photo with the previous president, who was symbolically handing over an object to her. Presiding over the January 13 handover was Li Kexin, a high-profile minister at the Chinese embassy in Washington. Li stood between two, a hand on each of their backs.

“No matter the time, no matter the situation, the Chinese government and 1.4 billion Chinese people will always have your back,” said Li in his remarks. “I believe that this new cohort of leadership will continue… to unite the power of overseas Chinese, and hold high the banners of anti-independence and peaceful unification.”

On paper, peaceful reunification associations, such as the Washington, D.C. branch, are independent from both the Chinese government and, largely, each other. But functionally, these associations are the United Front’s most ubiquitous outposts in the United States. And as the leader of one of the oldest such associations in the world, He, who also goes by Helen, serves as a top point of contact between the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing and the Chinese-American community in greater Washington, D.C.


“Peaceful reunification associations”—the term refers to Beijing’s intent to obtain sovereignty over Taiwan—have a close relationship with the United Front Work Department, in some cases functioning almost as an extension of its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the government agency that focuses on outreach to the Chinese diaspora. (Sun Chunlan, who until 2017 directed the United Front Work Department, simultaneously served as the executive vice president of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Unification in Beijing.)

The peaceful reunification association has established chapters in over 70 countries, according to the organization’s website. In the United States, there are more than 30 chapters in cities across the country, including San Francisco, Chicago, Houston, New York, and Washington, D.C. And while “peaceful reunification” was one of the original aims of United Front work, the associations in different countries may engage on many issues, including territorial integrity flashpoints such Tibet, Hong Kong, and maritime claims in the East and South China Seas.

Peaceful reunification associations serve as one of the CCP’s main connection points with Chinese-American communities. They function as welcome centers for visiting government officials, as platforms for the dissemination of party propaganda, as hubs that allow Beijing to identify and potentially co-opt prominent community members, and as centers for local community organizing, such as hosting cultural events.

The Washington branch is particularly illustrious. Founded in 1973, it was one of the earliest such organizations, and Beijing has praised its accomplishments. The organization sent a delegation to Beijing in 2015, where they met Tan Tianxing, the deputy director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. Tan praised the organization, saying that since its founding in 1973, the Washington branch has “done a lot of useful work” to “fight Taiwanese independence and promote unification.”

“After the Tiananmen Square massacre, the party launched a decades-long expansion of United Front activity abroad. The aim was to build party-linked networks in overseas Chinese communities, keep them connected to Beijing, and quash any anti-party organizing.”
At its heart, United Front strategy involves amplifying friendly voices and suppressing critical ones. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the CCP realized that it had a major global image problem, and it feared that the pro-democracy movement would flourish in overseas Chinese communities and then seep back in China. So the party launched what would become a decades-long expansion of United Front activity abroad, particularly among diaspora communities. The aim was to build party-linked networks in overseas Chinese communities, keep them connected to Beijing, and quash any anti-party organizing.

These overseas efforts have targeted independent Chinese-language media outlets, Chinese student and community groups, Chinese businesses and organizations, and increasingly, prominent non-Chinese individuals and organizations, including campaign donors and politicians, with the goal of convincing them to promote Beijing’s policies and interests in their host countries.

Anne-Marie Brady, a fellow at the Wilson Center who researches the United Front’s activities in New Zealand, describes the goal of United Front work among overseas Chinese communities as “[getting] the community to proactively and even better, spontaneously, engage in activities which enhance China’s foreign policy agenda.”

Peter Mattis, a former CIA China analyst and a research fellow in China studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, takes it a step further.

“The purpose of this department is to turn Americans against their own government’s interests and their society’s interests,” he told The Daily Beast. “It’s undermining the integrity of our democracy and it’s getting Americans to do it themselves.”

And by targeting Chinese-Americans, “it foments discord and encourages racial divisions. And what’s worse is, I think the party knows it.”

“They’re essentially taunting foreign governments like the United States to turn on their Chinese populations,” Mattis added.

United Front activity creates discord within the Chinese-American community as well. It actively creates pro-Beijing groups and pits them against Taiwanese and Tibetan groups, dissidents, and Falun Gong practitioners. As one Taiwanese-American told The Daily Beast, “It’s like everyone is in a faction and they’re trying to gauge what faction you’re in.”

In Australia, a major scandal unfolded last year after it was revealed that Huang Xiangmo, a top political donor and president of the country’s peaceful reunification association, had attempted to use his donations to sway Australia’s position on the South China Sea, a hotly contested region that China claims as its own. In New Zealand, the peaceful reunification association organizes Chinese community members to fundraise and block-vote for China-friendly politicians.

Less public scrutiny has been applied to peaceful reunification associations in the United States, so less is known about their activities. But according to former Western intelligence officials, the United Front and its U.S-based proxies actively cultivate ties to campaign donors in America. And the United Front has made it clear that it wants overseas Chinese to get involved in their respective countries’ politics to sway things in China’s favor.

And that’s exactly what He Xiaohui, the newly appointed head of Washington’s peaceful reunification association, has said Chinese-Americans ought to do.

“Helen” He came to the United States in 1988. In the 2000s, she became politically active in Maryland, lobbying the state government to make Chinese lunar new year an official holiday, founding an umbrella group for Chinese hometown associations called the Coordination Council of Chinese American Associations, and organizing voter drives in the Chinese community. In 2010, she was awarded the Governor’s Volunteer Service Award. She has also donated to the campaigns of local and state-level politicians.

Or at least, that’s what her English-language online footprint says. Chinese-language sources paint a different picture.

In 2005, He said in an interview with official party mouthpiece People’s Daily that Chinese people in America should get involved in civic spaces to oppose Taiwan independence and to “fight for the support of American people for China to achieve unification.” Unification with Taiwan, which has ruled itself since 1949, is one of the party’s top core interests.

In April, in an interview with the pro-Beijing newspaper Qiao Bao, for example, He criticized the recently-passed Taiwan Travel Act, which makes it easier for government officials from the U.S. and Taiwan to visit each other, and the 2018 National Defense Authorization act, saying they “interfered in China’s internal affairs” and “seriously violated the One-China Principle.”

Statements such as these are a window into He’s views, but also demonstrate a specific United Front strategy. When the United States adopts a policy that Beijing doesn’t like, official news outlets and website can approach people like He for comment, then tout those statements as evidence that Chinese-Americans don’t approve of Washington’s latest move. One intended audiences for this evidence is Chinese people in China -- it serves to bolster the party’s image as receiving support from Chinese around the world, not just at home.

He has worked for years in local-level community and political organizing in Maryland, and has become known among Maryland politicians for her ability to reach the Chinese community. Lily Qi, a current Democratic nominee for Maryland state delegate, described He as “one of those great connectors to pay attention to local level.” If you need to reach out to the local Chinese community, Qi told The Daily Beast, “she would always step up, more than most people, and follow through.” (Helen He did not respond to a request for comment).

That level of influence is just what United Front officials look for as they scout out potential recruits.


In 2009, while serving as president of the Chinese hometown associations group, He was invited to Beijing to serve as an overseas delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), one of China’s two rubber-stamp legislatures and another important United Front body that identifies influential overseas Chinese and aims to incorporate them into the party’s overseas goals.

Being chosen as a CPPCC delegate means that “these people are recognized by the [Chinese] party-state,” said Gerry Groot, who researched the United Front and serves as head of the department of Asian studies at the University of Adelaide in Australia. “The United Front department has seen these people as being influential and important in their communities, and is seeking to increase or deepen their ties to China, as the ancestral land.”

“In rewarding them, those people get status in their communities back home,” continued Groot, “and in many cases it increases their influence back home. And that means that these people go back much more committed to supporting the party than they were.”

A common thread runs through much of the United Front’s related activities in the United States and other Western democracies. It uses the freedoms guaranteed in liberal democracies to promote Beijing’s own ends. At times it resembles the tools that democracies such as the United States use to promote their own interests—funding friendly media outlets, recruiting sympathetic locals—but Chinese influence operations often employ elements of secrecy, coercion, and repression that the United States usually does not.

It also means that any response to the United Front must be carefully calibrated to preserve the rights and freedoms of Chinese-Americans.

“It is tempting to frame all party-state encroachment as a national security issue,” wrote Mattis and Samantha Hoffman, a research fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, in May. But “bringing national security tools to bear risks what makes America exceptional. As the CCP tightens its grip, the United States should extend an open hand. It means ensuring Chinese students, scholars, and perhaps future Americans do not have their right to liberty impeded on American soil.”

“Rising to China’s challenge, however, is as much about being a better America as it is finding the appropriate strategic response.”

Whenever Chinese President Xi Jinping makes high-profile visits to cities abroad— whether Washington, Prague, or Auckland—he is almost invariably greeted by crowds of enthusiastic Chinese students wearing red t-shirts and carrying signs proclaiming their support. They line the streets outside of the meeting venue, sometimes for days, and local media outlets tend to be impressed with the level of committed patriotism that Chinese students display for their country’s leader, who has overseen a sweeping ideological crackdown on Chinese society and higher education.

But such demonstrations are often organized by Chinese consular officials, who work through the Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, or CSSAs, that exist on the campuses of universities around the United States and many other countries. CSSAs are another good example of United Front strategy at work in the United States. There are between 100 and 150 CSSAs at universities around the United States, and many of them are quite large and influential on campus. These are not the only Chinese student groups in the U.S., but unlike other groups, CSSAs typically consider themselves to be under the “official guidance” of the consulate—language they often include on their websites in Chinese but not in English. Many or most CSSAs receive funding from the Chinese embassy.

In return for their assistance and funding, Chinese consular officials make occasional political “asks” of CSSAs. These asks include quiet political mobilization campaigns. Any time a top Chinese leader visits a U.S. city, consular officials will direct student groups to wear red t-shirts, carry Chinese flags, hold enthusiastic signs, and fan out onto the streets to welcome the visiting leader. Sometimes the consulates offer cash compensation to students, up to $60 per day in some cases. They often provide the t-shirts and flags, may pay for transportation, and may provide food and snacks.

“At times they resemble the tools that democracies like the United States use to promote their own interests. But Chinese influence operations often employ elements of secrecy, coercion, and repression that the United States usually does not.”
Chinese students are joined by delegations from other Chinese community organizations such as hometown associations who have received similar directives from the consulates, creating sizable crowds that easily drown out small groups of Chinese dissidents or other protesters. The resulting reports in both Western and Chinese language media typically portray these activities as “patriotic” demonstrations by “supporters of Beijing.”

There’s another reason the party wants to organize such large crowds. As participants have told The Daily Beast, one goal is to take up as much space as possible in prime locations in front of meeting venues so that would-be dissidents simply have no room to lodge their protests against the CCP.

This isn’t organic patriotism, though certainly many Chinese are patriotic. But it is intended to look like it. And the scale and scope of this covert political mobilization is striking. Embassies have been able to organize large pro-Beijing demonstrations in major cities all over the world for at least 15 years, and mainstream media coverage almost without exception portrays such events as evidence of organic grassroots support for Beijing—precisely the goal of United Front work.

A United Front policy which has become increasingly prominent in the past two decades is to encourage “huaren canzheng,” or Chinese participation in the politics of the countries they live in. Qiu Yuanping, the current director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, which is under the direct oversight of the United Front Department, regularly encourages Chinese living in the United States and elsewhere to get involved in politics and to vote.

It’s a policy that by nature is tricky to discuss. In the United States, Chinese communities have traditionally been politically marginalized, and efforts to get more Chinese-Americans to vote and run for office are sorely needed. “Of course it is completely normal and to be encouraged that the ethnic Chinese communities in each country seek political representation,” the New Zealand scholar Brady writes in her report.

But the United Front efforts to encourage overseas Chinese to participate in politics are not “spontaneous and natural development,” writes Brady.

“This policy encourages overseas Chinese who are acceptable to the PRC government to become involved in politics in their host countries as candidates who, if elected, will be able to act to promote China’s interests abroad,” says Brady, “and encourages China’s allies to build relations with non-Chinese pro-CCP government foreign political figures, to offer donations to foreign political parties, and to mobilize public opinion via Chinese language social media; so as to promote the PRC's economic and political agenda abroad.”


Here’s an example of what that can look like. Yang Chunlai, a Chinese engineer, came to the United States in 1990. He later became the president of the Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers, a U.S.-based group founded in 1992. In his role as ACSE president, Yang traveled to China in 2007 to participate in a conference for overseas Chinese organizations hosted by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office.

At a speech he gave at the conference, Yang said that Beijing views overseas Chinese political participation in host countries as a means to serve China.

“China has gone through three stages regarding its approach to overseas Chinese making contributions to China,” said Yang. “The earliest stage was emphasizing that overseas scholars should return home to serve China. Later, we realized that serving China doesn’t necessarily require returning to China. Now, China is placing an emphasis on our development in foreign countries, paying close attention to whether or not we can enter local mainstream society and play an active role in the politics and debate of our host countries.”

Yang added, “Next year is a big election year in America; voting is hard logic. ACSE hopes to take advantage of this opportunity to further expand our influence on American mainstream society.”

Perhaps Yang’s name rings a bell. That’s because he was arrested in 2011, accused of stealing trade secrets in a scheme to set up an exchange in China. He pleaded guilty, was convicted in 2015, and sentenced to four years probation. In the reporting on his arrest, trial, and conviction, his participation in United Front-related activities in China was not mentioned.

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Nest Of Spies

Post: # 166910Unread post Gary Oak »

I wonder why they didn't show a photo of her ? Could it be that she is so gorgeous that she may get a fan club like that redhead Russian spy that I have also posted about on this thread did.

Oops! ‘FSB spy’ in US Embassy Moscow was Russian and hired by US Secret Service, Guardian reports

Britain’s Guardian newspaper is reporting that a Russian spy has been caught working in the US Embassy in Moscow. It’s alleged she had been there for over a decade and was cunningly disguised as a Russian.
In revelations that frankly pose the question of whether America’s security agencies should continue to use the term ‘intelligence’ when describing themselves, the Guardian alleges that the woman had actually been hired by the US Secret Service.

It’s also claimed that having given the Russian national the all-clear to work at the very heart of America’s diplomatic mission in Moscow, they then allowed her access “to the agency’s intranet and email systems,” including “the schedules of the president – current and past, vice-president and their spouses, including Hillary Clinton.” The Secret Service was either working at a level of genius mere mortals cannot begin to understand, or they were being incredibly stupid. I know where my money is.

Read more
Paul Manafort departs US District Court, 31 Jul. 2018, Yuri GripasRussophobia Digest Part 3: Dentist denial, Manafort’s Russian elephant, and Putin on Brexit
The Guardian reports that: “The woman had been working for the Secret Service for years before she came under suspicion in 2016 during a routine security sweep conducted by two investigators from the US Department of State’s Regional Security Office (RSO).

“They established she was having regular and unauthorised meetings with members of the FSB, Russia’s principal security agency.”

If this story is true, surely not even the most rabid American patriot could blame Russia’s FSB of taking advantage of that situation.

It’s alleged that the Secret Service found out about the suspicions in January 2017, but instead of launching an inquiry, it decided let the suspect go quietly a few months later “to contain any potential embarrassment.”

It’s possible they also wanted to give her a few extra months to make absolutely sure she’d stolen all the secrets available to her, although this is pure speculation on the part of your writer, but you wouldn’t be surprised either, would you?

The Guardian was told by the US Secret Service that it “recognizes that all Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) who provide services in furtherance of our mission, administrative or otherwise, can be subjected to foreign intelligence influence.”

That will be reassuring to Americans, because if the Guardian’s story is correct, it did appear that they hadn’t recognized the danger.

It’s reported that an intelligence source claimed “her frequent contacts with the FSB gave her away… numerous unsanctioned meetings and communications.” Gave her away after more than a decade… nice one Sherlock.

The Guardian’s source then went on to say, “The US Congress is focusing on Russian hackers when it is possible that all of the information they needed to get into the system came from the internal breach in the Secret Service.”

My advice would be to stop focusing on Russian hackers, and concentrate on who you’re hiring… in the Secret Service!

https://www.rt.com/news/435067-oops-fsb-spy-in-us/
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Blue Frost
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Post: # 166963Unread post Blue Frost »

Nope, no intelligence there, lol, a Russian spy dressed as a Russian :think: might say something to someone intelligent.
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Post: # 166982Unread post Gary Oak »

I have been googling to try and get a photo of her. I bet that she is stunning.
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Post: # 167003Unread post Blue Frost »

Image
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Renee
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Blue Frost wrote: August 10th, 2018, 1:22 pm Image
Looks like every other Russian pole dancer to me. Only older..... :laugh:
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Post: # 167013Unread post Blue Frost »

LOL, where did you see all those poll dancers, I hope the other half of them looked a lot better. :teehe:
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Post: # 167014Unread post Renee »

Blue Frost wrote: August 10th, 2018, 5:22 pm LOL, where did you see all those poll dancers, I hope the other half of them looked a lot better. :teehe:
I used to see them at a place I worked while in college.

They all have that generic Russian stripper look. Blonde, blue eyed, wide nose, .... Typically Eastern European. I think they pour them out of a mold over there because they all look like clones of each other...😀

And not to sound antisemitic but they are all sneaky, obnoxious, little jew bitches.
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